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Facing The Future: 
The Balkans To The Year 2010 
1. Introduction: The Balkan Burden 
“The Balkans” have both geographic and geopolitical significance. 
Geographically, it refers roughly to the region bounded by the Adriatic Sea, 
the southern Carpathian mountains, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean 
Sea. Geopolitically and even geo-historically, “the Balkans” have 
accumulated numerous and often contradictory connotations, sometimes 
patronising, sometimes wistful, but often disparaging. 
For example, the Balkans have been described as the major crossroads 
between Europe and the Middle East and as a battleground between the 
major empires. The region has been depicted as a rich conglomerate of 
cultures and religions and as an ethnic and religious conflict zone. In recent 
years, the Balkans have been viewed as both a critical security zone and as 
an unstable non-European periphery. 
Since the Collapse of communist Europe, the “Balkans” have once again 
captured the headlines in the American and West European media and the 
attention of foreign policy makers. The concept of “Balkanisation”, 
following the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc and the collapse of the 
communist Yugoslav federation, has again entered the security vocabulary. 
It has come to signify, much as it did at the beginning of this century, a 
simmering i nferno of conflict and instability that no outside power can 
control and no local power can evidently escape. Janusz Bugajski 
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As a result, all the countries of this geographic region have been 
collectively framed into a geopolitical framework that no state can 
purportedly surmount. The pejorative “Balkan” image thus allegedly 
explains the often bloody “ethnic conflicts”, the unreformable authoritarian 
regimes, the rampant criminality, the customary corruption, and the 
incurable economic backwardness. 
Ironically, it has suited two specific parties, one interested and one 
disinterested, to perpetuate these Balkan myths. On the one hand, the forces 
of n ationalism, authoritarianism, and ethnic division active in parts of the 
region have thrived on this peculiar image of non-redemption to 
consolidate their positions and to try and forestall any outside interference. 
On the other hand, trans-Atlantic policy makers lacking sufficient strategic 
vision and commitment to  pan-European integrity have manipulated the 
Balkan image to justify inaction and the assignment of South Eastern 
Europe to the permanent status of an outsider. 
It is against such powerful myth making and image generation that both the 
domestic reformers and foreign sympathisers have struggled to transform 
the Balkans and to propel the region toward the European mainstream.  
Their task during the past decade has been profoundly complicated by the 
wars within and between the Yugoslav successor states, by the repression 
perpetrated by Serbia’s Milosevic regime, by the collapse of the Albanian 
economy and the subsequent armed uprising, and by the uphill battles of all 
Balkan states to complete their transition from totalitarian communism to 
democratic capitalism. 
At the start of the 21
st century, the time is ripe for a major reassessment of 
the Balkan region: for a sober analysis of the present condition and for an 
informed projection of alternative scenarios of development during the next 
decade. In this analysis and projection of Balkan instabilities and 
opportunities, the following states and quasi-states have been included: 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, 
Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. 
Part one of this paper examines the geopolitical context in which the 
Balkans are located at the end of the 20
th century. It therefore assesses, in Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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turn, the international environment, the regional parameters, and specific 
country developments. The bulk of the analysis projects and examines three 
alternative scenarios for the Balkans during the next decade: regional 
regression, secure development, and progressive integration. 
The first scenario envisages a major breakdown in the region’s 
development, marked by accelerating domestic devolutions, spiralling 
regional r ivalries, and growing international isolation. The second scenario 
depicts a minimal constructive evolution characterised by domestic 
stabilization, r egional cooperation, and increasing international 
involvement.  The third scenario p osits a maximal constructive 
development for the Balkans, i nvolving major domestic transformations, 
regional Synchronization, and i nternational integration. It is in order to help 
promote the latter scenario that this paper is offered. 
2. Geopolitical Context: Diversified Instabilities 
Since the fall of communism and the unravelling of the Soviet bloc in 1989 
a new dividing line has descended across the continent. Although not as 
impervious as the Iron Curtain, it nevertheless separates “Central Europe” 
from the “Balkans”, particularly in the perceptions of many analysts and 
policy makers. The reasons are both internal and international. 
The post-communist governments in several Balkan countries have failed 
to capitalise on the opportunity to transform their ossified economies and to 
institutionalise democratic pluralism. Furthermore, the brutal wars in 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo have spread the image of 
ceaseless ethnic conflicts and intolerant nationalism as the inescapable 
destiny of the Balkan peoples. Such perceptions have undermined efforts to 
help transform the region and prepare it for European integration. 
While the ongoing turmoil in the Balkans is the symptom of a deeply 
rooted political, economic, and social malaise, it is important to examine its 
context as well as the commonalties and differences between individual 
states. This may enable one to pinpoint the differing stages of development 
and empower policy makers, both in the region and outside, to devise Janusz Bugajski 
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viable solutions enabling the region to “catch up” with Central Europe and 
to avoid a negative scenario of growing marginalization, peripheral status, 
and perpetual instability. 
Regional Parameters 
The Balkan states share a common legacy of communist rule with all of its 
implications: political centralization, party control over all state institutions 
and public bodies, police repression, centralised command economies, the 
outlawing of private initiatives, and the atomisation of society.  However, 
three divergent Marxist-Leninist systems were operative in the Balkans 
with differing implications for post-communist reform: an essentially 
Stalinist and isolationist regime in Albania; orthodox communist regimes in 
the Soviet bloc states of Romania and Bulgaria; and a more reformed 
communist system in Yugoslavia that shared some features with the 
Central European countries. 
Political Immaturity:  In the more repressive systems, the opposition 
movements were weak, divided, and disorganised.  Pervasive police 
controls, public fear, and widespread apathy thwarted any large-scale 
manifestations of dissent and independent social activism. There was an 
absence of an alternative elite that could sow the seeds of a civil pluralistic 
society and a dearth of large independent churches or cultural activities that 
could nourish autonomous civic activism. The private economic sector was 
virtually non-existent in Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, while the power 
struggles within the ruling communist parties were largely between 
dogmatists and reformers rather than between intra-system reformers and 
liberalizers favouring a multi-party system. 
During the past decade, the Central European countries of Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the three Baltic 
states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), have displayed greater success in 
dismantling the old political structures and building pluralistic 
democracies. An organised and broad-based alternative elite was present 
and a wide spectrum of political parties emerged in which the influence of Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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extremist groupings, whether nationalist or Leninist, was effectively 
marginalized. 
The reformist states also proved more successful in developing a dynamic 
private sector, or entrepreneurial middle class, and establishing the 
institutional underpinnings of  a private non-state economy. This has not 
guaranteed that the democratisation and marketization process is completed 
in Central Europe because further legal, political, and property reforms 
remain necessary to bring these states into line with standards prevailing in 
Western Europe, as evidenced in the conditions established for European 
Union (EU) accession. 
By contrast, in much of the Balkan region, the reform process in both the 
political and economic spheres has been obstructed by an entrenched post-
communist political stratum.  Sectors of the old elite have also benefited 
directly from economic restructuring by gaining control over semi-
privatized state property.  In sum, the development of a participatory civic 
society and the rule of law have been thwarted by the forces of 
authoritarianism, cronyism, and statism.  These negative trends have been 
particularly evident in several former Yugoslav republics, even though 
their points of departure in the late 1980s were comparable to that of 
Central Europe. 
Authoritarian Temptations:  Various forms of authoritarianism have 
emerged in the Balkans since the demise of totalitarian Communist rule. 
The former Leninist parties discarded their Marxist precepts in order to 
retain or regain the most important levers of  power. Where they were 
successful, the ex-communists and their various allies, adopted an 
assortment of ideologies and programs to garner some measure of popular 
support through the electoral process and to manipulate public opinion. 
They have rallied around two major clusters of issues: statist populism and 
ethnic nationalism. 
The Balkan populists have not presented a clear ideological profile or a 
viable long-term socio-economic program. Instead, they have endeavoured 
to appeal to broad sectors of the population by offering simplistic remedies 
to invariably complex economic and social problems. They simultaneously Janusz Bugajski 
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underscored the importance of the state led by a strong national party in 
providing political continuity, strong leadership, public security, and a 
broad welfare umbrella. 
The statist socialist-populists have not reformulated classic Leninist parties 
with the intention of re-communising their societies and re-establishing a 
totalitarian monopoly over political life. Nevertheless, they obstructed and 
exploited the transformation process to their advantage and adopted 
strategies to undercut the position of democratic, liberal, and reformist 
groupings. 
For example, the statist-populists have ensured unequal political 
competition through their control  over the most important media outlets, 
especially state television and radio, in which government and party 
remained intertwined. They retained substantial portions of the old 
communist party property assets, communications networks, and 
organisational structures. They deliberately slowed down judicial reform 
and prevented the emergence of an independent judiciary. At local level, 
the post-communist networks have remained particularly pervasive. Hence, 
the democratic forces have generally proved more successful in the larger 
urban areas than in small towns and villages. 
The statist-populists also established broad patronage systems. Through 
them political loyalists have benefited from the sale and distribution of 
state assets and the quasi-privatisation process. The ruling parties have also 
maintained a system of intelligence gathering and police surveillance over 
the political opposition. Although not as pervasive or repressive as under 
the communist system, this has nonetheless hampered the development of a 
balanced democracy. The post-communists calculated that a formal 
democracy could co-exist with an informal authoritarianism. Instead of 
seeking to destroy all vestiges of political pluralism, the leadership 
estimated that selective controls over the most important state and public 
institutions could sufficiently preserve their positions of power. 
New authoritarian leaders have also closely intertwined the ruling party 
with key government organs. This has been defined as a “partitocracy” 
even though it falls short of a totalitarian one-party system. In some Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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instances, they have used the strong presidential system specified in 
national constitutions to promote their powers and disregarded 
parliamentary prerogatives. In other cases, they have benefited from the 
political flux and constitutional and legal ambiguities to strengthen 
personal controls. One-party domination has been buttressed by the form of 
public administration prevalent in much of the region. In some states, 
instead of a “merit system” among the  civil service a “spoils system” 
developed in which the election winners basically replace virtually all 
government workers and administrators with party loyalists. 
Democratic Fragmentation: A second set of factors has assisted the ruling 
Balkan elites: the political, ideological, and organisational fragmentation of 
the diverse opposition movements. The resurrected historical pre-war 
parties, including Liberals, Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and 
Peasants, have proved to be comparatively weak. Meanwhile, the broader 
anti-communist fronts in Romania, Bulgaria, and elsewhere, splintered as a 
result of personality clashes, ideological divergences, and policy 
differences. They also found it difficult to gain sizeable constituencies and 
remained susceptible to governmental manipulation. 
The statist populists placed several obstacles to comprehensive 
democratisation and were accused by the political opposition of dictatorial 
tendencies. Instructively, similar charges were levelled against the anti-
communist  Democratic Party in Albania, which during its spell in 
government in the 1990s also upheld tight controls over the mass media, 
the judiciary, the security forces, and other public institutions. Such a 
persistent phenomenon indicates that the political culture of statism and 
authoritarianism remains deeply embedded in the region among a broad 
spectrum of parties including former Communist and some ex-dissident 
circles. 
A political culture of dialogue, tolerance, and compromise has shallow 
roots in much of the Balkans. Nearly fifty years of Marxism-Leninism 
contributed significantly to distorting political relations by prescribing 
seemingly easy solutions to complex problems. This legacy has infused 
governmental policy in much of the region. Former class enemies are now Janusz Bugajski 
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commonly represented as national traitors or as alien enemies. Slow 
progress has been achieved in the process of civic acculturation and 
political participation. In such conditions, political life and social 
interaction can become rapidly polarised and intolerant. 
 
Nationalist Resurgence: The resurgence of nationalism and ethnic politics 
has proved especially stark in the Balkan region where historical 
competition over territories and minorities has been reanimated and 
manipulated by an assortment of political actors. Nationalist politicians 
have appealed d irectly to collectivist ethnic identity and antagonistically 
defined their countries “national interests” while seeking support from a 
cross-section of the electorate. Ultra-nationalists operate on two chief 
principles: collectivism and exclusivism. Ethnic collectivism serves to unite 
a society around its perceived vital interests, while exclusivism defines 
these interests in relation to a domestic or foreign threat. 
The collapse of Titoist Yugoslavia during 1990-1991, and the emergence of 
five new states, sparked a variety of nationalist responses. They ranged 
from the relatively benign pro-independence nationalism of the Slovenian 
and Macedonian governments to the radical and xenophobic ethno-racism 
exhibited by militant Serb and Croat militias in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
backed by their patrons in Serbia and Croatia. Their policies led to forced 
expulsions and the mass murder of rival ethnic groups in order to create 
ethnically exclusive territories. 
Contrary to much conventional wisdom, Leninism did not “freeze” ethnic 
relations or bury nationalist ideologies. It actually exploited ethno-
nationalism to replace the failing notions of class struggle and socialist 
internationalism. It was therefore relatively easy for many communist 
functionaries schooled in collectivism and centralism to switch over to 
overtly nationalist positions once Leninism became defunct. Ethnic 
nationalism also enabled new alliances to be forged between former 
communists and ultra-nationalist anti-communists. 
Leninism disfigured the Balkan societies by stifling the emergence of civic 
societies. Instead, it tended to buttress collectivist models of individual and Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
 11
group obligations to the state rather than the principles of individual liberty 
and human rights protected by the government. When communist party rule 
evaporated, democratic institutions only slowly emerged in these societies 
and public input into decision-making remained limited. Moreover, the 
communists developed little t radition of mediating and resolving inter-
group disputes, including those based on distinctive ethnic and religious 
interests. 
Ethnic Escalation:  Ethnic politics have been manipulated by a range of 
political groups. Leaders looking for popular support have capitalised on 
nationalist sentiments and exploited the presence of minority or foreign 
scapegoats. Political extremists and criminal opportunists, especially in the 
former Yugoslavia, have taken advantage of widespread public 
disorientation and deflected mass fears and blame towards vulnerable 
minorities or ethnic neighbours. Populists and nationalists have launched 
offensives on various ethnic adversaries. In some instances, the post-
communist authorities have relied on smaller ultra-nationalist parties  to 
maintain workable governing coalitions. The danger remains that even in 
opposition, elements of the old communist apparatus will form alliances 
with radical nationalists to disrupt incumbent governments and promote 
anti-minority programs. Such an approach may have some resonance 
among sectors of the population experiencing serious economic decline. 
The activism of nationalist parties, amidst broad-based perceptions of 
internal or external threat, acts as a catalyst for the emergence of 
authoritarian regimes espousing “national unity” and displaying intolerance 
toward political pluralism and democratic competition. Such a process can 
severely inhibit progress towards democracy, the rule of law, a free media, 
and the development of a participatory civic society. 
Xenophobic nationalism promotes authoritarianism as it fosters an 
intolerant political climate and justifies governmental controls over various 
public institutions on the pretext of defending allegedly endangered 
national interests. The proponents of a civic society, based on a balance 
between individual and minority group rights, on unrestricted political Janusz Bugajski 
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competition, an open mass media, and the rule of law, may thereby face an 
uphill struggle against a pervasive current of nationalist threat. 
Furthermore, the emergence of a traditional political spectrum has been 
obstructed in parts of South Eastern Europe by nationalist, ethnic, and 
regionalist politics. The nationalist-civic spectrum often intersects with an 
embryonic traditional left-right continuum, thereby confusing the programs 
of specific political parties. This phenomenon focuses political life around 
national collective questions rather than civic issues and has side-tracked 
the agenda for economic transformation. 
Parts of the Balkans have witnessed a process of ethnic escalation 
promoted by nationalist politicians. Yugoslavia has proved a fertile case 
study of how the growth of nationalism among one nationality can trigger 
an escalation of nationalist competition between the leaders of two or more 
ethnic groups, often in search of political office and economic privileges. 
The rise of nationalism is thereby widely interpreted as an act of self-
defence and protection against discrimination, repression, expulsion, or 
even physical annihilation. 
Economic Stagnation: Populism, nationalism, statism, and authoritarianism 
are inevitably reinforced by poor economic performance. Although strictly 
centralised command economies no longer exist in the region, the progress 
of systemic transformation, transparent privatisation, marketization, and the 
development of legalistic states has been thwarted by special interest 
groups many of which emerged from the communist apparatus. 
Sectors of the old elite have benefited directly from limited economic 
reform programs by conducting what has been labelled as “nomenklatura 
privatisation”. In this process, former state property has been sold off 
cheaply to newly formed companies controlled by well-connected members 
of the former communist parties. Although Central Europe has not escaped 
this corrupt practice, in the Balkans and in many former Soviet republics it 
has assumed mammoth proportions. It has restricted market competition 
and the development of a genuine entrepreneurial stratum that could 
strengthen the democratisation process and accelerate economic progress. Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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Fearful of a market reform program that could dislodge the old 
nomenklatura from its privileged positions and seeking to benefit from the 
legal and regulatory confusion, the statist-populists have hampered market 
reform in virtually all the Balkan states. Through their control over major 
media outlets, they have played on fears of far-reaching market reform 
especially among vulnerable sectors of society, including unskilled manual 
workers, pensioners, and state employees. 
Substantial sectors of the population have exhibited fear of economic 
decline, confusion about their future material prospects, resentment 
towards the new rich, insecurity about their safety and security, and 
susceptibility to populist, socialist, and nationalist rhetoric. Hence, 
demands for economic security, personal safety, and political predictability, 
encouraged by the state media, have promoted electoral support for 
paternalism, welfarism, statism, and authoritarianism. 
Criminal Bounties:  The inherited socialist mismanagement, productive 
inefficiency, and industrial uncompetitiveness have been compounded by 
nepotism, patronage, and outright corruption. Indeed, a growing wave of 
officially sponsored criminality has swept across South East Europe. Not 
only has crime seriously undermined legalism and terrorised a nervous 
public, but it has also destabilised the region’s fragile economies and quasi-
democratic political institutions. 
Eastern Europe has proved to be a bountiful land of opportunity for 
assorted criminal elements, organised gangsters, and corrupt officials. The 
varieties of criminal activity can be divided into three broad categories: 
domestic gangs, international crime syndicates, and politically connected 
networks that prey on the disintegration of state economies. All three forms 
of criminality have prospered in the Balkans not only because the forces of 
law and order were left unprepared, but also because well-connected 
politicians and security officials themselves benefit from “robber 
capitalism” and illicitly acquired funds. 
In the domestic context, local gangs, who can bribe poorly paid or corrupt 
police officials, thrive on the new availability of weapons and the fear or 
gullibility of large sectors of the population. Robbery, murder, drug Janusz Bugajski 
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smuggling, prostitution, and money laundering have been on the rise in 
recent years and the police seem overwhelmed by the scale of the problem. 
Mobsters have filled the legal limbo between statist communism and an 
embryonic market economy. 
Domestic East European gangs are either linked with or remain in 
competition with well-organised international syndicates. These new 
“multi-nationals” focus primarily on smuggling, including weapons, drugs, 
stolen goods, and people. In many instances, the syndicates are better 
armed than the local police forces. Racketeers also smuggle East Europeans 
and refugees from the Third World into the prosperous European Union for 
a substantial fee. 
Drug traffickers have revived the traditional “Balkan route” between Asia 
and Western Europe after the lifting of United Nations sanctions against 
Yugoslavia. The route runs through Turkey, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia into 
Central Europe. Heroin, hashish, and cocaine from Turkey, Pakistan, and 
the Middle East are again flooding the European market and analysts 
believe many local couriers as well as East European officials are 
benefiting from this lucrative trade. Meanwhile, customs officials lack the 
necessary equipment to detect the drugs and are desperately looking for 
Western a ssistance particularly along the Black Sea coast and the Danube 
river. 
Systemic Retardation: As economies deteriorate, organised crime escalates. 
Violent attacks have soared in parts of the region as a method for settling 
scores between mafia-like b usiness groups. Such phenomena can 
destabilise the transition process as illicit businesses in conditions of 
economic crisis can trigger political fragmentation. Links between corrupt 
officialdom and organised crime can be traced across Eastern Europe. 
When the system of centralised controls collapsed, the well-connected 
Communist apparatchiks pounced on state resources to line their pockets 
with public wealth. They have posed as “businessmen” while stripping 
their countries of scarce funds and resources. 
Leading political figures from Croatia to Bulgaria have either embezzled 
state funds or established shady companies using public resources, without Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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any legal restraints. The stability of the Balkan states is therefore as much 
dependent on effectively combating organised criminality as it is on 
emphatically pursuing market reforms. Without an effective anti-syndicate 
campaign alongside economic progress and transparent market 
competition, an increasingly pauperised and desperate public may become 
prone to the incitement of social unrest which fuels political instability. 
Long delays in overhauling and marketizing the economy may initially 
cushion the population and the regime against the rigors of capitalism. But 
in the long term, such a regressive policy will simply drive the government 
further into debt and make unavoidable reforms that much more painful 
and destabilising in the future. 
Furthermore, where governing parties have unfairly dispensed privileges to 
a politically loyal elite, and where the legal system is unreformed or tied to 
party-state interests, corruption and mismanagement become endemic. 
Serious economic decline in conditions of political favouritism, organised 
corruption, and social revolt can rapidly propel a country towards 
authoritarian rule and provide opportunities for political factions 
determined to engineer ethnic and international conflicts. 
Weak States:  With the termination of monopolistic and centralised one-
party rule, much of Eastern Europe experienced a counter-phenomenon of 
political fragmentation, institutional weakness, legal confusion, and official 
corruption. In some Balkan countries, such conditions persist, whereby 
weak state structures or feeble leaders prove unable to pursue political 
reforms, economic restructuring, or modernisation. 
In the late 1990s, Albania presented the most poignant example of these 
problems during and after the collapse of the failed “pyramid” schemes in 
the spring of 1997. The country’s state structure weakened and the central 
and local governments only slowly regained control over the countryside in 
an attempt to restore public order. Equally worrisome was an evident 
symbiosis between politics and crime, similarly to the situation in Serbia, 
where politicians and policemen were believed to be corrupt and criminal 
gangs controlled substantial sectors of the economy. Criminal gangs 
possessed no political affiliation or ideological loyalty. They are commonly Janusz Bugajski 
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opportunistic and gravitate toward those in power so they can bribe or 
bypass officialdom. Criminality can thus become both a symptom and a 
cause of political paralysis. 
International Environment 
Despite the changing political and international environment, certain 
fundamental security interests in European stability have remained 
unaltered. These i nclude: guarantees that the continent remains free from 
domination by any expansionist power; a Europe devoid of destabilising 
national and ethnic strife; domestic stability in the post-communist 
countries; progress towards continental integration; and the development of 
a pan-European security pillar that can cooperate with the United States in 
a range of global issues. 
Nato’s Changing Role:  All of these objectives have demanded active 
American involvement within the only proven security institution on the 
European continent, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
However, the shifting security situation has called for an evolution of Nato 
from a system of collective defence into a wider security entity willing to 
handle a range of instabilities. The continuing viability of Nato has clearly 
become dependent on a transformation of both its mission and its structure. 
The crisis in the Balkans has seriously tested Nato’s cohesion during its 
evolution from a system of collective defence to a structure of pan-
European security. Most recently, the Kosovo problem is having a direct 
impact on two questions that are vital to long-term stability in the Balkans: 
the future of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the 
development of pan-Albanianism. The war in Kosovo has both an 
immediate and a longer-term impact on the Nato Alliance. In the short 
term, it challenges the commitment and effectiveness of Nato leaders in 
ensuring security b eyond Alliance borders. In the long term, ongoing 
Balkan conflicts (in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia-Montenegro, and 
Macedonia) will test Nato’s cohesiveness and purpose for several pertinent 
reasons. Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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First, the nature of the Kosovo conflict may be emblematic of the kinds of 
localised or regionalized crises that Nato may face during the coming 
years, conflicts revolving around issues of ethnicity, territory, power, and 
the control of various resources. Failure to handle such disputes could 
render the Alliance powerless in future challenges and actually encourage 
conflict. 
Second, the Kosovo crisis tested inter-allied relations on a number of 
fronts: whether over appropriate military responses (with differences 
apparent, for example, between French and American-British positions) or 
over the motives for involvement in the c risis (as between Greece and 
Turkey). For instance, if the South Balkan crisis endangers the integrity of 
Macedonia, then Greece and Turkey may increasingly find themselves on 
opposite sides of the conflict with Ankara favouring the Muslim Albanians 
and Greece aligning itself more strongly with Serbian or Slavic Orthodox 
interests. 
Russian Resistance: Third, the Balkan wars and specifically the battle for 
Kosovo has highlighted the evolution of the Nato-Russian relationship and 
tested the supposition that W ashington and Moscow can cooperate as 
partners in security issues. Russia’s adamant opposition to any international 
military intervention against Milosevic’s Serbia demonstrated Moscow’s 
essentially anti-Nato goals. Russia obstructed allied policies for two main 
reasons: to enhance its prestige and influence in the Balkans and to weaken 
the credibility of Nato’s projected new missions in Europe.  To accomplish 
these strategic objectives, the Yeltsin-Primakov government sought to 
weaken the international response to any regional crisis and to preserve 
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in power. With the ouster of 
Milosevic in October 2000 and the election of Vojislav Kostunica and the 
DOS (Democratic Coalition of Serbia), Moscow’s more assertive Putin 
administration pushed to maintain Belgrade as its key regional ally and was 
rewarded with Kostunica’s conformation that Moscow remained an 
important partner for Serbia. 
Moscow has suffered various setbacks in Eastern Europe during the past 
few years. Nato’s expansion to Central Europe and its military success in Janusz Bugajski 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina has been viewed negatively by Russian policy makers, 
as it enhanced the credibility of the Alliance as the key institution of 
collective European security. Moscow also lost a key ally in the Balkans 
when the Bulgarian government of President Peter Stoyanov, declared its 
intent to join NATO and to diminish its political and economic dependence 
on Russia. Russian leaders remain fearful that Nato will assume a more 
prominent role throughout South East Europe and thereby permanently 
exclude Russia as a serious regional player. 
The Kremlin is motivated by geostrategic “business” interests as well as by 
great power ambitions. Oligarchic interest groups in Moscow together with 
Russian intelligence services maintain close ties with assorted Balkan anti-
Nato forces, ex-communist apparatchiks, and criminal syndicates and do 
not want their profitable activities disrupted by Nato interference. Hence, 
power and profit closely intersect in the region and Russia will continue to 
pursue policies that restrict allied involvement and seek to steadily 
undermine the American presence. 
With an internationally relegitimized Serbia, Russia is assured of a major 
ally in the Balkans from where it can exert influence further afield. 
Moscow has interests throughout a much wider region, and in particular it 
seeks to prevent any further Nato expansion or allied success in a zone it 
considers to belong to its “sphere of influence”. Under President Vladimir 
Putin, the  Kremlin has accelerated its attempts to unseat the democratic 
government in Bulgaria, as evidenced in the regular expulsion of Russian 
agents posing as diplomats in Sofia, to shore up the Kostunica 
administration in Serbia, and to create broader problems f or Nato 
throughout South East Europe. 
Despite Nato’s success in halting genocide in Kosovo, the Kremlin charges 
KFOR with failing in its mission, of allegedly tolerating pan-Albanian 
militancy in Kosovo and Macedonia, and of promoting regional 
destabilisation. It is thereby challenging Nato to either destroy the Albanian 
guerrilla movement and their support base or to abandon the Balkans 
altogether. Moscow seems intent on making South East Europe safer for its 
oligarchic lobbies and criminal cartels linked  with the re-energised KGB Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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structure. In this vein, the Kremlin is intent on preventing the final 
disintegration of Yugoslavia and even bringing Macedonia into a tighter 
Serbian-Russian orbit and thus increasing pressures on a currently pro-
western Bulgaria.  
Country Developments 
In order to gain a fuller picture of conditions throughout the Balkans, it is 
useful to conduct a brief country survey and explore the similarities and 
diversities between individual states. It is also important to ask the 
question: how many of these countries have actually passed the point of no 
return from authoritarianism and statism to democracy and a free market? 
Uncertain Albania: After a decade of turmoil, Albania remains a weak state 
that has veered between hard-line communism and political 
ungovernability. Albanian politics is divided between two forces that 
control the political space  - Socialists and Democrats. The differences 
between them have little to do with ideology, policy or program, but more 
with access to power and resources. Albania is politically highly polarised 
with little middle ground of dialogue or compromise. Most of the smaller 
parties are tied in with one of the major formations and gain jobs and 
privileges from this association. Cronyism and nepotism remain rampant in 
an unstable economic climate. 
Both government and parliament remain largely paralysed amidst bitter 
power struggles and personal interests. Parliamentarians tend to be 
interlocutors for the executive power rather than genuine independent 
legislators representing their constituencies. This political standstill is 
likely to endure thus undermining the legitimacy and impact of any 
attempted reform program. 
The relationship between central and local governments is also one of 
paralysis and mutual  obstruction. Local authorities have little power and 
limited financial resources. During the 1990s, the state has become a 
network of narrow interests often interlinked with criminal gangs, usually 
referred to as clans, rather than consisting of a system of authoritative and Janusz Bugajski 
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representative public institutions. No credible centrist party has emerged 
and young people invariably shun politics altogether. Indeed, many young 
professionals continue to leave Albania because of limited opportunities 
and general disillusionment. 
Albania is a transit point for cross-Balkan smuggling and trafficking routes. 
It has also developed a vibrant home industry of crime. It is also an 
international center for money laundering and for criminal networking. 
Tirana loses enormous amounts of money each year on customs and tax 
evasion, while members of the administration as well as local police chiefs 
are widely believed to profit from corruption or criminal involvement. 
Criminal gangs have no political affiliation or ideological loyalty. They are 
opportunistic and gravitate towards those in power so they can bribe or 
bypass officialdom. Criminality itself is both a symptom and a cause of 
Albania’s political paralysis. 
During the past two years, the Socialist government of Prime Minister Ilir 
Meta has made some valiant efforts to restore law and order, to crack down 
on organised crime and rampant corruption, to reform the judicial system, 
and to relaunch a credible economic reform program. Although it has 
registered some successes with international assistance, the political chasm 
between the two major parties continued to disrupt political life. With 
parliamentary elections scheduled for the summer of 2001, Tirana faced a 
major test for its political stability and a clear signal whether its reform and 
rebuilding program would be durable. 
Divided Bosnia-Herzegovina:  Since the signing of the Dayton accords in 
the fall of 1995, Bosnia-Herzegovina has displayed uneven progress toward 
unification and multi-ethnic pluralism. Nationalist forces and vested 
political and economic interests among all three ethnic groups have 
continued to obstruct the full implementation of the international 
agreement. The maintenance of a sizeable Nato presence was deemed 
essential to keep the peace and to apply political pressure on the feuding 
political leaders. Even though some moderate politicians were strengthened 
by the international community, nationalist leaders have continued to Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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dominate, especially at local levels in the Serb entity and the Croat-
majority areas inside the Bosnian Federation. 
The survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state remained dependent 
primarily on the presence of Nato and other international institutions to 
provide physical security, state resources, economic reconstruction, 
institutional continuity, and territorial integrity. Hard-line nationalists 
calculated that international resolve would weaken over time and that their 
resistance to ethnic reintegration and civic democracy would eventually 
pay off as international organisations disengaged from Bosnia and de facto 
recognized the existence of two sovereign states. Meanwhile, Bosnia’s 
democrats were frustrated by the initial weak pressures exerted by 
international organisations on nationalist “warlords” and the slow 
development o f civic institutions. But the civic activists and integralists 
were also cognisant that over-dependence on international actors could 
undermine the authenticity and indigenous development of Bosnia’s multi-
ethnic and civic-democratic institutions. 
Although centrist and civic forces proved more successful than in the 
previous ballot in the general elections on 11 November 2000, the three 
nationalist parties gained sufficient representation to obstruct multi-ethnic 
integration. In particular, the Serbian Democratic Party and the Croatian 
Democratic Union captured most of their ethnic space and looked set to 
continue blocking both democratic reform and governmental authority at 
the central level. In the Serb entity, Mirko Sarovic of the hard-line Serbian 
Democratic Party (SDP) won the presidency in the first round of voting, 
while the more moderate Milorad Dodik finished a poor second. 
The Social Democrats performed well in the Federation and sought to 
bridge the ethnic divide but were not prepared to enter a coalition with any 
nationalist party. The creation of a moderate coalition would be a 
prolonged process preventing any effective decision-making and 
perpetuating a basically dysfunctional central government. 
The nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) launched a new 
challenge to the survival of the Federation in early 2001 when it declared 
“self-rule” in Western Herzegovina and threatened to withdraw from all Janusz Bugajski 
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national institutions. This was allegedly in protest against changes in 
Bosnia’s electoral rules  that favoured civic, moderate, and multi-ethnic 
parties. CDU leader Ante Jelavic decided to test international resolve to 
keep Bosnia t ogether and to exploit the sense of growing regional 
insecurity. The CDU move propelled the Croatian community on a 
collision course with Western officials overseeing the Dayton accords. The 
results would also serve as a lesson for the leadership of the Serb entity in 
their moves toward separation from Bosnia. 
The process of refugee return in Bosnia has also proved extremely slow. 
This was primarily a result of resistance by nationalist mayors, a lack of 
housing and infrastructure, and the complacency of international agencies 
responsible for reintegration. Local leaders among all three ethnic groups 
were guilty of preventing refugees from reclaiming their homes. Many 
cantonal and city authorities did not want any dilution of their 
demographic, political, and economic base by allowing for the return of 
thousands of non-ethnics. They engaged in bureaucratic obstruction and 
orchestrated physical attacks on refugees. Only a few thousand refugees, 
out of an estimated displaced population of some one and a half million, 
actually settled across the inter-entity and inter-ethnic boundaries. Most of 
the returns took place within the majority ethnic zones. 
Progressive Bulgaria: The administration of President Petar Stoyanov and 
Prime Minister Ivan Kostov has continued to enjoy broad public support 
even though the impact of renewed economic reforms was painfully felt by 
broad sectors of t he Bulgarian population. Bulgaria has made significant 
economic progress and adopted a more activist role in regional security 
questions in the Balkans. Sofia has pursued far-reaching economic 
restructuring, inaugurated reforms in the justice system, and l aunched a 
campaign against organised crime and corruption. Nevertheless, the 
government faced a number of major challenges, including the completion 
of the privatisation program, liberalisation of the agricultural sector, and 
further legal and administrative reforms.  
Bulgaria made significant progress on the security front. An agreement was 
signed in September between Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Macedonia, Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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Romania, and Turkey to establish a Multinational Peace Force in 
Southeastern Europe (MPF). The MPF was based in the Bulgarian city of 
Plovdiv and would be subordinate to either the United Nations or the 
OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) in its future 
European peace-keeping missions. 
During the crisis in neighbouring Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian government 
agreed to allow Nato to use the country’s airspace in any planned bombing 
of Serbian forces. Sofia viewed the conflict in Kosovo as a profound 
danger to regional stability in the Balkans and sought to assist Nato in its 
peace-making e fforts. Sofia’s dispute with Macedonia over the validity of 
the Macedonian language was resolved in March 1999 opening up a 
number of important bilateral agreements between the two countries. 
The Democratic government also underscored its commitment to both Nato 
and EU membership and actively campaigned for inclusion in these 
organisations. Its foreign policy priorities loosened Bulgaria’s relations 
with Russia, while Moscow continued to manipulate the question of its 
energy supplies to Sofia as a form of political pressure. In order to lower its 
dependence on Russian gas supplies, Bulgaria sought ways of diversifying 
its e nergy sources. In early 2001, Moscow stepped up its attempts to 
subvert Bulgaria’s political system and to emplace pro-Russian loyalists at 
the helm following elections scheduled for late spring. Several Russian 
diplomats were ejected from the country with disclosures that they were 
involved in more than espionage activities but in bribing and blackmailing 
politicians and overseeing major economic buyouts. 
Reformist Croatia:  By the close of 1999, Croatia’s progress towards 
democratic rule and membership of international institutions remained 
stalled by its quasi-authoritarian government. A broad range of domestic 
reforms continued to be obstructed, including reform of the election law, an 
end to persecution of the independent media, the rooting out of corruption 
and p olitical patronage, and the unhindered return of Serbian refugees to 
their pre-war homes. Zagreb was also criticised by the international 
community for concentrating too much power within the central 
government and particularly in the President’s office. Tudjman held Janusz Bugajski 
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substantial constitutional powers enabling him to block democratic 
reforms. 
With the death after a long illness of President Tudjman in December 1999, 
the popularity of the CDU plummeted. Parliamentary elections were held in 
January 2000 and a two party democratic opposition coalition, won the 
ballot and subsequently formed a governing coalition with a smaller 
coalition. The splits within the CDU became even more apparent during the 
presidential elections in February 2000 when the CDU opponent Stjepan 
Mesic, won the presidency in the second round. The two elections signalled 
the end of the CDU era and the beginning of a democratic administration 
that faced numerous problems during its first year in office, not least of 
which was to keep the diverse government coalition together during the 
implementation of long overdue political and economic reforms. Top on 
the political agenda was the constitutional reduction of presidential powers, 
restructuring the state administration, and dealing with widespread 
corruption in the privatisation process inherited from the Tudjman’s 
administration. 
Tudjman’s Croatia was subject to severe international criticism for its 
human rights record, the harassment of independent publications and non-
governmental organisations, and persistent discrimination against the Serb 
minority. Zagreb was also attacked for openly supporting nationalist Croats 
in Bosnia. By contrast, the Mesic administration made strenuous moves to 
sever Croatia’s financial and political links with separatist groups in Bosnia 
and reiterated its support for Bosnia’s independence and territorial 
integrity. Despite its evident successes and democratic credentials, Zagreb 
was faced with potential social unrest stemming from an economic reform 
program that necessitated cuts in government spending. 
Although the CDU seemed to have little opportunity of regaining power, its 
political and economic networks appeared intent on disrupting Zagreb’s 
programs and regaining public credibility as defenders of Croatia’s 
“national interests”. The coming year would be important in determining 
whether Croatia had indeed progressed permanently from a  quasi-
authoritarian to a democratising transitional state. Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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Unstable Macedonia: Since gaining its independence, Macedonia has been 
faced with a number of internal and external challenges to its stability. 
General elections in 1998 installed a pragmatic coalition government, 
paradoxically combining nationalist parties from the Macedonian and 
Albanian populations. Although leaders of the ex-nationalist VMRO 
(Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) party claimed they had 
discarded their nationalist orientation, Albanian community spokesmen 
remained concerned that difficult economic conditions coupled with 
escalating regional tensions could revive anti-minority sentiments. 
Macedonia’s Albanian leadership pushed for progress in incorporating the 
large minority in all governmental institutions, but warned that any 
regression could dissolve the coalition government and revive calls for 
autonomy, federalisation, or even secession. Macedonian police believed 
that cells of a secessionist National Liberation Army (NLA) were active in 
the country seeking to recruit frustrated young people in a struggle against 
Macedonian integrity. 
In March 2001, the NLA launched a guerrilla war in western Macedonia 
and the international community expressed fears that Macedonia could be 
destabilised and drawn into a wider Balkan war. The Macedonian 
government was caught in an unenviable dilemma, between Albanian and 
Macedonian nationalism. A weak response against the guerrillas could 
alienate it from the Slav population and lead to its downfall. But an overly 
strong response could alienate it from its Albanian allies and also lead to its 
collapse. To try and achieve a proper balance, Skopje tried to act tough 
with NLA gunmen while preparing to launch a new dialogue with Albanian 
leaders in Macedonia in order to address some of their demands on 
constitutional changes and minority rights. 
Stagnant Romania: Romania’s democratic coalition government collapsed 
in the parliamentary elections in November 2000. The ballot was won by 
the Social Democrats while a strong nationalist note was injected into 
Romanian politics with the strong showing of the anti-minority and 
expansionist Greater Romania Party (GRP) that became the second largest 
parliamentary group. Ion Iliescu was elected President in December 2000, Janusz Bugajski 
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defeating the GRP’s nationalist leader Vadim Tudor. The unexpected 
popularity of the GRP caused dismay among democrats and minority 
leaders who feared a turn toward ethnic confrontation. Tudor had 
stimulated significant appeal among young people frustrated with 
government policies and performed well in parts of Transylvania. The new 
government inherited a difficult economic situation and the prospect of 
losing its international standing if it pursued authoritarian, populist, or 
nationalist measures. 
Romania’s ambitious economic reform program has stagnated before the 
balloting and the government was criticised for delaying the privatisation 
program. Romania’s governing democratic coalition was also involved in 
various internal disputes that undermined its reform program.  Bucharest 
faced a daunting task in steering an effective reform program in the face of 
bureaucratic obstruction and mounting social disquiet. 
Because of the absence of political consensus, Romania’s economic 
transformation t owards a market economy has visibly slowed down. 
Officials remained nervous about the negative and destabilising social 
implications of their reformist measures. They feared growing public 
protests against financial austerity and the closure of state enterprises. 
Bucharest was also criticised by the international community for not doing 
enough to combat crime and corruption or to demilitarise its police force. 
Romania continued to make significant strides in promoting inter-ethnic 
cooperation. However, some human rights organisations claimed that the 
government had not done enough to prevent discrimination and public 
hostility against the large Roma (Gypsy) population.  Disputes were also 
evident between Romanian officials and the large Hungarian community. 
Nonetheless, the Hungarian coalition remained a part of the government 
despite ongoing disagreements over two issues: Hungarian language 
education and administrative autonomy. By early 2001, it was unclear 
whether the new Iliescu administration would maintain cordial relations 
with the Magyar leadership or would exploit anti-minority sentiments to 
distract public attention from the inevitably difficult economic reform 
program. Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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Desperate Serbia:  The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) has been 
beset by serious ethnic and economic crises even with the ouster from 
power of Slobodan Milosevic in October 2000 and the election of Vojislav 
Kostunica as Yugoslav President. The Serbian government confronted the 
loss of Kosovo, an Albanian rebellion in the Presevo region of Southern 
Serbia, and a growing movement for independence in the restless republic 
of Montenegro. 
Serbia confronted a legion of political, economic, ethnic, and social 
problems inherited from the Milosevic years. Politically, the new 
administration confronted the task of keeping together a disparate coalition 
of 18 parties, while removing the Socialists and their allies from public 
offices without provoking a counter-revolution. Indeed, some observers 
believed that the Kostunica coalition had forged a  deal with the Socialist 
apparatus to protect them from trial and dispossession. In return, Serbia’s 
security commanders had actively participated in the dislodging of 
Milosevic. 
Economically, Belgrade needed to implement a tough reform program 
involving w holesale restructuring, budgetary discipline, and competitive 
privatisation, while undermining and eliminating the interest groups that 
controlled the Serbian economy. Socially, the authorities had to maintain 
sufficient public support while engaging in far-reaching reforms while 
preventing potential populist and nationalist reactions as a result of deflated 
expectations over economic prosperity. 
Constitutionally, Serbia and Montenegro seemed unable to reformulate 
their federal arrangement on a more equitable basis. The government in 
Podgorica seemed determined to hold a referendum on independence that 
would effectively terminate the Yugoslav federation. In territorial terms, 
the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo will continue to simmer because of 
the irreconcilable positions of Belgrade and Pristina on the question of 
Kosovo’s independence. Clearly, international actors needed to maintain a 
major role in a still volatile environment. 
Critical Kosovo:  Kosovo has become a burning issue not only for the 
stability of the South Balkans but also for the credibility of the Atlantic Janusz Bugajski 
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Alliance. A viable solution to the conflict between Serbs and Albanians has 
evaded both the protagonists and the international community for over a 
decade. The diametrically opposed positions of the two parties, with 
Belgrade adamant about the territorial integrity of Serbia and Pristina 
unwilling to backtrack on demands for independence, has presented a 
major challenge for Nato policy makers and international mediators. 
Although Nato liberated Kosovo in the summer of 1999 from the repressive 
policies of the Milosevic regime, numerous problems have materialised in 
building the foundations of a functioning multiethnic democracy. The lack 
of a legitimate Kosovo Albanian authority and persistent conflicts between 
two rival Albanian parties, the Democratic League of Ibrahim Rugova and 
the political descendants of the Kosovo Liberation Army, have contributed 
to paralysing the development of political institutions and the emergence of 
a civic society. 
Organised crime has also threatened the security of residents, perpetuates a 
climate of revenge against the minority Serb community, and undermines 
the emergence of a democratic system. International agencies operating in 
Kosovo have paradoxically undercut the emergence of embryonic Albanian 
local authorities. The establishment of a Kosovo advisory council under the 
supervision of UN representatives has not filled the political vacuum 
because it has no real decision-making powers. 
The large-scale international presence has contributed to suffocating the 
development of indigenous political institutions and a local civil society. 
Political parties and a range of civil groups and NGOs faced an uphill 
struggle in making the transition from clandestine organisations to more 
formal entities. Critics charged that without resolving the status question 
and constructing an authoritative Kosovo authority that could become 
instrumental in building a democratic independent state, the territory would 
remain prone to  uncertainty and instability and would necessitate a large 
Nato presence for many years to come. 
Impatient Montenegro: The rift between the Yugoslav and Montenegrin 
governments widened to an apparently unbridgeable chasm. Since the 1998 
general elections, Podgorica has reasserted its identity and steadily moved Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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towards independence. The Montenegrin authorities strengthened their 
quasi-state by promoting a multi-ethnic government, creating an effective 
internal security apparatus, introducing a separate currency, and 
establishing direct ties with foreign governments and investors. 
The fall of Milosevic and the election of Vojislav Kostunica as President of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in October 2000 was perceived 
in the West as terminating Podgorica’s drive for independence. However, it 
actually had the opposite effect because the threat of military force by 
Belgrade was lifted and the government had proceeded substantially toward 
statehood and was not prepared to reverse gears. 
Montenegro faced two possible options: refederation or independence. 
Noone was clear how exactly refederation or confederation can be 
engineered and how it will function. Clearly it cannot be constructed from 
above by the federal government in Belgrade for which 75% of 
Montenegrins did not vote. A genuine confederation would require two 
independent states (Montenegro and Serbia) agreeing to share some 
elements of their sovereignty. But this begs the question: can the present 
Yugoslav structure be transformed into a genuine equal confederation, 
otherwise why share statehood? Most experts agree that a “union” between 
two such demographically unequal states will simply lead to domination by 
the larger member. 
The second option was renewed statehood but it does not exclude some 
coordination of policy with Serbia, and this has been Podgorica’s proposal. 
Montenegro sought a “velvet divorce” from Serbia with some coordination 
of defence and foreign policy. But this was opposed by Belgrade, who 
sought to preserve a single international subject with a devolution of 
powers. The two positions could not be reconciled. The governing coalition 
in Podgorica decided to hold general elections in April to broaden and 
deepen its legitimacy in preparations for a republican plebiscite on 
independence during the summer. Such a move would effectively dissolve 
the Yugoslav federation and highlight the unresolved question of Kosovo’s 
future status. Janusz Bugajski 
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3. Balkan Futures I: Regional Regression 
The worst-case scenario for the Balkan region during the next decade 
would involve a series of domestic crises accompanied by fundamental 
political breakdowns and economic meltdowns. Although the degree and 
impact of regression and devolution will undoubtedly vary between states, 
each case of internal stagnation or domestic political crisis will contribute 
to exacerbating regional tensions and accelerating inter-state conflicts.  
As a result of such “regional regression”, over the next decade the Balkans 
or certain states within the region could drift toward peripheral status in 
Europe and on the margins of the trans-Atlantic enlargement process. The 
United States and the European powers will primarily endeavour to shield 
themselves from disruptive influences emanating from regressive or 
stagnant countries through a policy of containment, conflict minimisation, 
and regional isolation. The prospects for most Balkan states gaining 
membership in either Nato or the EU would rapidly recede into the 
distance. 
Domestic Devolution 
Instead of registering consistent progress towards democratic pluralism, the 
rule of law, a regulated market economy, and equitable minority rights, the 
Balkan states could be faced with either long-term stagnation or serious 
destabilising reversals in their reform process. As the previous section 
underscored, during the past decade all states in the region have been 
affected by a slowdown in their transformation from communism to 
democracy, either as a result of deliberate obstruction or as a consequence 
of persistent nationality conflicts. Even more severe domestic breakdowns 
in the process of political and economic transformation could result from 
several inter-related factors: 
Resurgent Authoritarianism: In most Balkan states, democratic movements 
face an uphill struggle against authoritarian trends. Either the old 
communist structures have not been fully dismantled or sectors of the ex-
Leninist apparatus and some of the former anti-communists have Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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appropriated nationalistic, populist, and xenophobic themes and policies. In 
some i nstances, these regressive forces were successfully elected to 
political office or obtained a substantial number of parliamentary seats. 
Support for democracy building and institutional reform from the Western 
democracies has often proved insufficient to deter or forestall new forms of 
“patriotic authoritarianism” in countries such as Serbia. Autocratic 
tendencies could also become bolstered in other states in South East 
Europe, with a corresponding weakening of civil-oriented, pro-European, 
and pro-Atlanticist political parties. 
In the midst of disruptive and painful economic reforms over the next few 
years, the region could face growing popular support for protectionist and 
anti-reformist governments and policies. Such a phenomenon could propel 
to power anti-democratic forces whether through national elections or the 
declaration of “emergency measures”. This would increase governmental 
arbitrariness, lawlessness, and a disregard of democratic procedures despite 
the holding of multi-party elections and the existence of the formal 
institutions of democracy. The new regimes are unlikely to try to restore a 
totalitarian political system. Instead, they will primarily seek to control the 
most important levers of power and to prevent what they will perceive as 
disruptive political competition. 
Political Infighting: An alternative unsettling scenario in the Balkans is one 
of endemic political paralysis through the frequent turnover of governments 
and the long-term instability of cabinets and coalitions. Instead of focusing 
on the pursuit of  a far-reaching economic transformation, government 
leaders will be preoccupied with political disputes and personality clashes. 
Vested interest groups seeking to preserve the status quo will deliberately 
stall the reform process. Political and personal business interests will take 
priority over programmatic issues, essential legal and economic reforms, 
and long-term national interests. 
Indeed, the “paralysis” scenario could lead to the breakdown of central 
governmental controls and the increasing de facto  autonomy of various 
regions and sub-regions. Such developments would be further reinforced 
by the expansion of criminal networks operating across state borders and Janusz Bugajski 
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tied to various political interest groups. In effect, a country could become 
ungovernable in a similar pattern to that witnessed in Albania following the 
public uprising in the spring of 1997. 
Social Breakdown:  This third scenario is closely linked with the second 
except that the impetus for political breakdown comes “from below”. 
Mounting social  unrest in protest against falling living standards and rising 
unemployment could be manifested in disruptive industrial actions, violent 
street protests, and the exploitation of public disquiet by militant nationalist 
groupings. A swelling wave of industrial strikes would prove difficult to 
contain particularly if the government remains fractured and weak and if its 
public support base is constantly shrinking. 
Such a degenerative scenario could demoralise the police and security 
forces. If the unrest turns  violent, the temptation would be to use the 
military against armed workers and street protestors. This worst case 
possibility could provoke a civil war, characterised by the Organization of 
self-defence militias, mutinies and splits within the armed forces, and an 
escalating spiral of violence against state institutions and rival political 
groupings. 
Populist-Nationalist Upsurge: In any of the three scenarios outlined above, 
radical populist or nationalist elements could seek to gain political power 
from collapsing governmental authority or from growing appeals for a 
strong-arm authoritarian regime. An ultra-nationalist administration that 
gains power either through parliamentary or non-parliamentary means 
would prove especially destabilising and threatening for the region. 
Domestically, it could, for example, lead to organised attacks against 
vulnerable ethnic, religious, or regional minority populations, a wave of 
officially sanctioned expulsions, or even prolonged inter-communal 
violence. 
An ultra-nationalist and xenophobic regime in any of the Balkan states 
could rapidly foster conflicts with various neighbouring states. Officially 
sponsored attacks on a particular minority could provoke pre-emptive or 
reactive moves to defend this population by a nearby “mother state” or by 
militia units condoned by neighbouring countries. In addition, a substantial Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
 33
refugee outflow could contribute to destabilising a nearby state, especially 
one that already confronts serious inter-ethnic or regional divisions. 
The most unsettling scenario would entail a series of ultra-nationalist 
victories in the Balkans, bringing to power political formations thriving on 
the manufacture of both internal and external nationality conflicts. Indeed, 
the success of militant nationalists in one state could actually stimulate a 
nationalist resurgence among minority populations and among neighbours 
on the pretext of “self-defence” or the alleged protection of endangered 
“national interests”. 
Even a relatively benign democratic administration, fearful of losing 
popular support to more radical forces, could thereby find itself drawn into 
a bilateral inter-state conflict or embroiled in a regional crisis. Traditional 
allies and historic rivals could find themselves lining up along the political 
barricades and threatening to escalate their rivalries in sub-regional blocs. 
In a scenario where Nato and other European security organs have 
minimised their direct involvement in the region, the danger of a war of 
words evolving into a war of deeds would become especially probable as 
the international deterrent factor would become largely absent. 
Regional Rivalries 
In assessing the prospects for serious regional conflicts in the Balkans, it is 
worthwhile to consider the most egregious existing problem areas t hat 
could further deteriorate during the coming decade. 
The Yugoslav Vortex:  Although Serbia has undergone a political rupture 
from the authoritarian regime of Slobodan Milosevic, the remnants of 
Yugoslavia remain as a major factor of instability in the Balkans. 
Belgrade's policies during the past decade have encouraged a series of 
crises, negative developments, unstable scenarios, and explosive problems. 
The former Yugoslav president thrived on crisis, war paranoia, and a sense 
of encirclement in order to  preserve his grip on power. The Milosevic 
regime was replaced in October 2000 by a more moderate administration 
led by the new Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica and a broad Janusz Bugajski 
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coalition government. Nevertheless, uncertainty and instability emanating 
from Serbia has continued to fan tensions over a wider region.  
If Kosovo and Montenegro actually slip out of Serbia’s grip, largely as a 
result of Nato’s intervention, the international community will need to 
weigh the regional impact of three new independent  states. There exists 
two possible outcomes of such a scenario: the growing destabilisation of 
the Balkans through a multiplicity of escalating regional conflicts or 
progress toward settling some combustible security issues revolving around 
the Serbian and Albanian “questions” (see Section 4). 
Pan-Albanianism: Most policy makers calculate that statehood for Kosovo 
and Montenegro will automatically destabilise the Balkans and unleash a 
regional conflagration. The “chaos theorists” argue that independence for 
Kosovo will ignite a series of ethnic conflicts in the South Balkans. For 
example, it will radicalise the large Albanian minority in Macedonia and 
precipitate the violent disintegration of this lynchpin state as nationalists 
battle for unification with a “ Greater Albania”. In addition, according to 
this supposition, Montenegro’s secession from Yugoslavia could leave the 
new state unprotected and vulnerable. It would energise the sizeable 
Albanian population in southern Montenegro to stage an armed revolt and 
demand separation and unification with Kosovo. This would provoke the 
potential fracturing of Montenegro at which point the government in 
Podgorica could appeal to Belgrade for direct military assistance. 
In order to avoid such destabilising scenarios, Nato leaders have adamantly 
opposed Kosovo's and Montenegro’s independence. Moreover, foreign 
governments remained apprehensive that the separation of both entities 
would contribute to unseating the fragile Kostunica government and lead to 
a multiplicity of new tensions in the region with the appearance of three 
new states with claims to each other’s territories. 
Some radical Albanian leaders have asserted that their ultimate objective is 
the “unification” of all Albanian lands, even if this goal is not shared by the 
majority of moderate Albanian leaders in each country. There are fears that 
the elected Albanian leadership is unable to control the activities of radicals 
as the guerrilla activities in Southern Serbia and North-Western Macedonia Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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have demonstrated. Some militant guerrilla networks seemed intent on 
provoking ethnic polarisation and fomenting regional conflicts in order to 
destabilise several Balkan states in order to carve out a larger Albanian 
state. 
Balkan Wars:  According to this latter scenario, Kosovo’s independence 
will lead directly to the destabilisation of Macedonia.  The large Albanian 
minority, particularly in the western parts of the country will push for 
unification with the new Albanian entity in Kosovo or provide support and 
manpower  for a spreading guerrilla war. This could unravel the fragile 
coalition government in Skopje, radicalise the Slavic Macedonian 
population, transform the moderate Macedonian nationalists into radicals, 
undermine social peace, and accelerate inter-communal c onflicts in the 
country.   
 
A Macedonian government facing internal unrest and a growing 
secessionist threat may find itself unable to control escalating tensions and 
a potential armed rebellion.  It may therefore appeal to several neighbours 
for a ssistance in handling its internal turmoil and protecting itself against 
the “pan-Albanian” menace emanating from both Kosovo and Albania. 
Such developments could therefore rapidly embroil Bulgaria, Serbia, 
Albania, Greece, and Turkey, either into a replay of the  Second Balkan 
War or into a protracted competition or struggle for influence and 
predominance in the South Balkans. Such a scenario could dramatically 
retard the entire region’s progress towards democracy and free markets and 
could prove an increasingly costly burden for European economic and 
security institutions. In particular, the involvement of both Greece and 
Turkey in a new Balkan conflict could provoke a full-scale war between 
two Nato allies who already suffer from numerous unresolved disputes. 
Destabilising Security Scenarios:  An additional contribution to 
destabilisation must be considered for the Balkan states over the next few 
years. The indefinite omission of these countries from the process of Nato 
and EU enlargement, especially if they are not offered solid assurances that 
membership is simply delayed pending necessary internal reforms, may Janusz Bugajski 
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actually generate major foreign policy turmoil. Indeed, some states could 
try to e nsure their long-term security through alternative alliance 
arrangements that could lead to new unsettling divisions on the continent. 
Some Balkan governments may petition for closer ties with Nato, through 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, through “special relationships” 
and other similar agreements, with the clear-cut goal of future membership 
and the obtainment of Alliance security guarantees. However, several states 
may seek a more independent or a more Eastern oriented security posture, 
especially those undergoing domestic political radicalisation or upholding 
serious doubts over ever attaining Nato membership. Three possible 
developments need to be closely monitored by the Alliance, if future 
instability is to be avoided or managed in the Balkan region: Nato–non-
Nato relations, the creation of alternative alliances, and the involvement of 
hostile outside powers. 
Nato–non-Nato Relations:  Although international treaties between the 
Balkan countries are crucial, and indeed a number of bilateral agreements 
have been signed in the past few years, their significance and permanence 
should not be overestimated. In several instances, their interpretation may 
be contradictory and their implementation may prove restricted. Policy 
makers must closely monitor the evolution of relations between the new 
Nato members and their immediate neighbours in South Eastern Europe, 
especially where there are unresolved issues of dispute. Such disputes may 
focus on contested questions over minority rights, territories, borderlines, 
and access to or ownership of economic resources. 
For example, conflicts between Hungary and Romania could sharpen, 
especially if Budapest feels more emboldened as a result of its Alliance 
status to pursue demands for Magyar minority rights and even Magyar 
territorial autonomy in neighbouring states. These claims could f ocus on 
Romanian Transylvania and Southern Slovakia, regardless of recent 
bilateral treaties and agreements on state borders and minorities. Such a 
posture by Budapest could be exacerbated if a more nationalist-oriented 
government emerges in Bucharest and  adopts an openly anti-minority 
program. Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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In its fifty-year history, Nato has limited experience of accepting a member 
undergoing major disputes with one of its neighbours who stood outside the 
Alliance structure. It can of course be argued that Nato membership will 
actually pacify potential conflicts, moderate militant elements, and 
reinforce security throughout the region. Nonetheless, much depends on the 
interpretation of Nato membership by the newly included states, as well as 
the reaction of neighbouring governments. 
The Hungarian-Serbian relationship also needs careful scrutiny, as the 
Serbian province of Vojvodina contains a sizeable Hungarian minority that 
could become the subject of mounting dispute over its status and political 
rights. Indeed, Budapest could adopt a more combative approach towards 
Belgrade, especially if the rump Yugoslavia begins to disintegrate and if 
Hungarian leaders calculate that Belgrade would avoid an outright military 
confrontation because of Hungary's Nato membership. 
Budapest could apply various forms of diplomatic, political, and economic 
pressures on Serbia in a strategy designed to force concessions from the 
government and even to draw its Nato allies into supporting its position. 
The calculation that Nato would politically or militarily support one 
member against a non-member such as Yugoslavia could actually have a 
destabilising effect where approximate military parity no longer exists. The 
Alliance could find itself increasingly embroiled in such disputes, whether 
as mediator, protagonist, or even as a combatant. 
Historical experience indicates that it is potentially dangerous to maintain 
substantial disproportions in the military capabilities of neighbouring 
countries. Nato membership for some states and the long-term o r 
permanent exclusion of others could create growing imbalances. While the 
new allies modernise and upgrade their armed forces, the excluded states 
may fall b ehind with obsolete equipment and fail to benefit to the same 
degree from Nato programs. Hence, in the event of staggered expansion, 
the initially excluded Balkan states will require access to Nato structural 
funds for reorganising and modernising their armies as well as for 
infrastructural projects important to coalition interests. Wider access is also 
needed by Balkan specialists to the high technologies related to the defence Janusz Bugajski 
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industry and communications. Thereby a gradual process of standardisation 
in armaments would help to enhance confidence and security between both 
the included and excluded states. In the absence of such programs, the 
Balkan states may drift away from the European collective security 
mainstream. 
Alternative Alliances:  Several Balkan states may actively pursue the 
formation of alternative Balkan alliance structures. And in some cases, the 
more assertive governments could apply serious and sustained pressures on 
the smaller South East European nations. For example, this scenario could 
materialize in the case of Bulgaria or Serbia vis-à-vis Macedonia, Romania 
vis-à-vis Moldova, and Serbia and Croatia vis-à-vis Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Conversely, some of the smaller states may look towards their neighbours, 
particularly those with strong historical and ethnic ties, to forge more 
binding alliances and political connections. Such a scenario could in turn 
provoke ethnic minorities or cross-border national groups to demand 
greater regional autonomy for fear of absorption into a Greater Serbia, 
Croatia, Albania, Bulgaria, or Romania. 
The larger Balkan powers may seek to absorb neighbouring territories 
inhabited by ethnic kinsmen or to control the major foreign policy 
decisions and economic resources of nearby states. Such policies in turn 
could also encourage the smaller states or the embattled minorities within 
these countries to resort to military means or to appeal for Nato protection. 
This would place the Alliance in a difficult strategic position in attempting 
to balance European security priorities with its military capabilities and 
political objectives in unstable regions of the continent. 
In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of the Dayton accords, if the 
country remains under the control of ethno-nationalists and Nato 
disengages, it appears unlikely that the state will remain united. Moreover, 
the governments in Belgrade and Zagreb  may become refocused on 
“defending” their ethnic kin and even carving up the country between 
them. The loss of Kosovo or Montenegro could actually energise 
Belgrade’s aspirations toward Bosnia’s Serb entity. The chief question may 
be over the exact process and timetable of division and annexation. This Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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could leave an e ssentially Bosniak or Muslim rump statelet sandwiched 
between them and intent on regaining ethnically purged territories. 
Paradoxically, Nato’s mission in Bosnia, or more precisely the failure to 
eliminate war criminals from positions of power, has in many respects 
consolidated the ethno-territorial status quo. The continuing dominance of 
nationalist networks in both entities may promote and even legitimise the 
creation of three ethnically homogeneous states. Among the many lessons 
of Bosnia since the onset of the Nato mission is that the preservation of 
peace does not ensure integration and the reconstruction of a single state. 
Moreover, Nato is evidently not equipped to engage in nation building or 
state construction in its current configurations or in its likely future 
mandate. This has clear implications further afield throughout South-
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
Extra-Regional Powers:  Some South East European countries may 
increasingly develop security ties with extra-regional powers in order to 
strengthen their defensive capabilities and their security posture vis-à-vis 
neighbouring countries, including both the new Nato members and non-
members. 
Close relations have already been established between Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and several moderate and radical Islamic states, as well as between Albania 
and Turkey and other Islamic countries. It is possible to envisage a scenario 
whereby political and economic ties develop into more binding military 
alliances encompassing some form of security guarantees or assurances of 
military assistance in the event of external threat. 
There are strong indications that Moscow is seeking to rebuild a broad 
sphere of influence in parts of Central and South Eastern Europe by forging 
closer alliances with unstable, authoritarian, or criminally connected 
governments in the region. Serbia remains the most useful wedge for 
Russia in exploiting the Balkan conflicts to its advantage, in creating 
disputes b etween the U.S. and its European allies, and in weakening the 
case for further Nato involvement and institutional expansion. 
With an internationally relegitimized Serbia, Russia is assured of a major 
ally in the Balkans from where it can exert influence further  afield. Janusz Bugajski 
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Moscow has interests throughout a much wider region, and in particular it 
seeks to prevent any further Nato expansion or allied success in a zone it 
considers to belong to its “sphere of influence”. Under President Vladimir 
Putin, the Kremlin has a ccelerated its attempts to unseat the democratic 
government in Bulgaria, as evidenced in the regular expulsion of Russian 
agents posing as diplomats in Sofia, to shore up the Kostunica 
administration in Serbia, and to create broader problems for Nato 
throughout South East Europe. 
Despite Nato’s success in halting genocide in Kosovo, the Kremlin charges 
KFOR with failing in its mission, of allegedly tolerating Albanian 
militancy, and of promoting regional destabilisation. It is thereby 
challenging Nato to either destroy the Albanian guerrillas and their support 
base or to abandon the Balkans altogether. Moscow may be intent on 
making the Balkans safe for its oligarchic lobbies and criminal cartels 
linked with the re-energised KGB structure. This could also prevent the 
final disintegration of Yugoslavia and bring Macedonia into a tighter 
Serbian-Russian orbit, thus increasing pressures on a pro-western Bulgaria. 
In the years ahead, Russian politics could undergo a more fundamental 
nationalist radicalisation accompanied by a more aggressive foreign policy. 
Russia’s return to an assertive authoritarianism cannot be ruled out given 
the country’s unstable and unpredictable political and economic climate.  
Moscow may then pursue more sustained efforts to bring the states 
excluded from Nato or inhabiting the European periphery into a closer 
Russian orbit. Moscow may also lend more direct support to terrorist and 
international criminal organisations, particularly if these are targeting 
Western interests. 
Over the next decade, ambitious extra-regional powers such as Russia may 
therefore endeavour to increase their role in various parts of the Balkans. 
The pretext could be to defend their co-religionists and vulnerable allies 
while projecting their influence throughout the region and constructing a 
broader anti-Western structure. The potential for hostile cross-regional 
alliances based on differing religious, ethnic, and economic interests, 
cannot be dismissed. Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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Some observers contend that the Balkan region may well be entering a new 
era of u npredictability and instability. Emerging sub-regional and cross-
regional political and security alliances may prove increasingly threatening 
to Western and Nato interests. For instance, in addition to many of the 
traditional security concerns, the new alliances will generate mounting 
security headaches in such arenas as ethnic warfare, local and anti-Western 
terrorism, arms proliferation, organised international crime, and refugee 
outflows. 
International Isolation 
The enlargement of Nato to the countries of East-Central Europe may have 
significant internal and external political and security implications for the 
states that will be excluded from the Alliance structure for an indeterminate 
period of time. Most policy analysts concur that the majority of Balkan 
countries are unlikely to gain admission in the foreseeable future. The 
inclusion of some countries, such as Slovenia, Bulgaria, or Romania, 
depends on their continuing progress in meeting the relevant criteria. They 
could prove to be  serious candidates during the next two years if indeed 
there is a “second round” of Nato enlargement. 
Paradoxically, the promise of future Nato membership and the requisite 
budgetary requirements for potential members could strain a country’s 
financial resources. Any substantial rise in defence spending could lead to 
manifestations of social tensions as government outlays on welfare 
programs may need to be correspondingly reduced. In the worst case 
scenario, with the prospect of domestic political and economic regression 
in several states as well as perennial regional tensions, none of the 
remaining Balkan countries will be included in either Nato or the EU 
during the next decade. 
Balkan Cauldron:  Even during times of progress, many of the Balkan 
countries a re considered to be beset by continuing internal instability and 
unsteady international relations. They evidently fail to meet all the basic 
criteria for Nato membership, including stable pluralistic democracies, 
reformed civil-military relations, consolidated market economies, resolved Janusz Bugajski 
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minority problems, and full treaties and territorial settlements with all 
neighbouring states. If major crises were to materialize in several states 
simultaneously or if a relatively progressive government were to 
experience a major reversal, then such negative perceptions will become 
reinforced. 
Another major fear of Western security analysts is that virtually the entire 
Balkan region could become a playground for international criminal 
syndicates and terrorist organisations in the next few years. As a result, in 
the “degenerative” scenario, instead of assisting each country to enter the 
Nato fold, Alliance leaders will endeavour to shield their countries from the 
security risks emanating from South East Europe. This would, i n effect, 
isolate the Balkans on a long-term basis from the rest of Europe. Through a 
combination of political and economic measures, the Alliance may attempt 
to construct a cordon sanitaire around the region in order to limit the most 
destabilising ripple effects. 
Negative Exclusion: The long-term or even permanent exclusion from Nato 
of aspiring Balkan candidates is a regressive strategy. It counters the 
concept of an integrated Europe with a common and coherent security 
policy enshrined in numerous declarations and political documents adopted 
by the EU, WEU, Nato, and the Council of Europe.  Either non-
enlargement, limited expansion, or “differential integration” could lead to 
the long-term isolation and marginalization of the excluded countries. 
During the coming decade, several Balkan states could find themselves on 
the periphery of an e xpanding Europe, whereby the absence of security 
guarantees will have negative domestic reverberations in terms of political 
stabilisation, economic reform, international relations, and Western 
investment. 
The exclusion of specific Balkan states from the enlargement process for a 
brief period of time could conceivably have some positive effects. For 
example, if a more specific timetable for membership were offered to 
prospective candidates, it could encourage excluded governments to 
continue with the complex and often painful reform process, given the 
promise of future Nato membership. However, the indefinite exclusion of Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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all Balkan states may have a number of negative repercussions both among 
rejected candidates and Nato skeptics. Several negative scenarios need to 
be considered by Nato planners, as they will also have implications for 
future missions, as well as for the security of South East Europe. 
Anti-Reformist Backlash:  The long-term exclusion of the Balkan states 
from Nato and the EU could strengthen the position of anti-reformist, 
authoritarian, and nationalistic political forces who will play on an anti-
Western card, charging discrimination by the Alliance against t heir 
countries based on ethnic, religious, economic, political, or strategic 
grounds.  Nationalists, xenophobes, and populists could gain increasing 
public sympathy, deflecting attention from pressing domestic reforms by 
seeking to radicalise the populace. 
The exclusion of Romania, for example, which has been canvassing 
strenuously for Nato membership, would not only be perceived 
domestically as a national disappointment and a governmental failure, but it 
could actually buttress the position of anti-Western and anti-Hungarian 
political forces. Nationalist parties could gain increasing public support as a 
consequence of exclusion, or they may even deliberately provoke political 
conflicts and social unrest. They could campaign vigorously on a platform 
of defending Romanian “national interests” against unwelcome outside 
influences. Such a situation would require careful management by a 
potentially besieged government seeking to preserve stability and 
maintaining the reform program on track. 
Nationalist, populist, and anti-Western groupings may be equally 
encouraged in other states to lobby for more widespread public support. In 
Bulgaria, the Nato-skeptic Socialist Party could bolster its contention that 
the West was deliberately consigning their country to the status of a 
backwater while simultaneously seeking to move Sofia closer toward 
Russia. In addition, a diminishing prospect of Nato membership for either 
Croatia, Albania, Macedonia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina could further 
radicalise ethno-nationalist forces claiming disinterest or even hostility 
from the Western powers. Janusz Bugajski 
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Democratic Regression:  The permanent or long-term exclusion of Nato 
candidates could weaken the position of democratic and pro-Western 
groupings whether inside or outside government. They may find it 
increasingly difficult to defend or justify their country’s omission from the 
Alliance. Opponents will charge them with illusory hopes about the West 
and their commitment to difficult economic reform programs may be 
challenged or dismissed as unnecessary and merely serving international 
corporate profits and undermining national interests. 
The process of political reform, pluralism, and democratisation may also be 
slowed down or even aborted as a failed and chaotic experiment sponsored 
by Western intelligence services in order to weaken the state and the 
nation. Public paranoia, promoted by the state-controlled media, may 
assume extensive proportions, poisoning political discourse and the 
rationality of decision-makers and public opinion alike. In such conditions, 
nationalists and populists could rapidly gain influence. 
As a result of these and other factors, Western influence in the Christian 
Orthodox countries (Bulgaria, Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro) and the 
potentially Islamic-focused states (Albania,  Bosnia-Herzegovina) could 
substantially decline in the years ahead. Indeed, the leading political forces 
may increasingly turn to non-Western or non-democratic political models 
as more appropriate to solving their domestic problems and maintaining 
internal stability. 
These factors, coupled with doubts about the desirability of Nato 
integration among a broad section of society and the opposition of 
important p olitical groups, could lead to a spiral of social instability and 
unrest. As a result, the attractiveness of Nato membership and even 
European integration could be further eroded within countries that do not 
currently appear as viable candidates but who continue to harbour 
aspirations for inclusion. Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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4. Balkan Futures II: Secure Development 
The minimal optimistic prognosis for the Balkan states over the next ten 
years envisages gradual but consistent progress in ensuring both internal 
stability and inter-state cooperation. This will help ensure a decade of 
steady regional development that can in turn contribute to making the 
Balkans an area of durable security instead of impending conflict. Such an 
evolution would also greatly contribute to each state’s progress for meeting 
the criteria for membership in both Nato and the EU. Indeed, some Balkan 
aspirants could be admitted to one or both institutions during the next two 
to five years. 
Internal and External Stabilization 
In order to consider the minimal optimistic scenario for the Balkans until 
the year 2010, it is important to evaluate the most critical, necessary and 
constructive domestic achievements that will have wider regional 
ramifications. 
Political Stability: Regular “free and fair” national and local elections and 
long-term governmental stability will remain as essential prerequisites for 
pursuing far-reaching economic and institutional reforms. Moreover, each 
Balkan government needs to ensure a measure of programmatical 
continuity between successive administrations so that the reform process 
does not veer between unpredictable periods of progress and reversal. 
During the past decade, the Central European states of Poland, Hungary, 
the Czech Republic, as well as Slovenia and the Baltic states, have 
guaranteed the forward thrust of their reformist agenda even where there 
has been a frequent turnover of cabinets and coalitions through the election 
process. Similarly, all the Balkan countries require a cross-party 
commitment to the goals of economic transformation and institutional 
reform whatever differences may exist between specific political 
formations in terms of the timetable and pace of such restructuring. In sum, 
the national constituency for reform must be both broad-based and 
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Institution Building: Successful political stabilisation also requires the 
consolidation of stable and authoritative democratic institutions based on 
constitutional principles. In particular, the organs of government need to 
have the confidence of the public and the commitment of all major political 
players. In this context, extremist extra-parliamentary parties advocating 
various forms of authoritarianism must be exposed and marginalized so 
that they do not undermine the nation’s body politic. 
A great deal can also be achieved to improve efficiency, competence, and 
professionalism among government officials and the civil service. Indeed, a 
core civic administration bureaucracy must be developed that provides 
continuity and credibility regardless of changes in government. The judicial 
system must become both independent and competent, in which absolute 
equality before the law is guaranteed, regardless of ethnicity, gender, or 
creed. 
In the security arena, the police and intelligence forces require strict 
governmental control and supervision as well as the authority and 
capability to improve their effectiveness. Public trust in the police forces 
will increase as their success in fighting crime and restoring law and order 
increases. Each government must focus on expanding professional police 
departments with Western assistance that can restore public trust and 
confidence in these institutions. 
 
Uneven progress has been made in the region in transforming civil-military 
relations according to Nato guidelines. This arena will continue to provide 
a valuable avenue of cooperation with the allies, in terms of knowledge, 
expertise, training, and exchange programs. Military streamlining needs to 
continue alongside the consistent professionalization of the armed services.  
The objective will be to increase their practical interoperability with Nato 
forces in a range of Alliance endeavours. 
Civil Society Development: Over the next decade, each Balkan country can 
make significant strides in enshrining the full array of human rights, 
including freedom of expression, conscience, assembly, association, 
movement, and worship. Each country can also develop a more robust Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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alternative m edia and a range of citizens’ interest groups, including 
business associations, consumers organisations, minority rights groups, and 
environmental lobbies. These constituencies will significantly enhance the 
democratisation process. Democratic politics does not revolve solely 
around the activities and ambitions of political parties, it aims to maximise 
public input into the decision and policy making process at local, regional, 
and national levels. 
The question of minority rights must be comprehensively resolved, whether 
through granting cultural and educational autonomy, some measure of 
territorial self-administration, regional decentralisation, or through a 
guaranteed proportion of seats in the national parliament. The protection of 
minority rights is not the exclusive preserve of national governments but 
has become a legitimate component of international human rights 
conventions. Hence, each Balkan state must pass legislation and pursue 
policies that comply with international obligations. Furthermore, the 
development of a multi-faceted and multi-organisational civil society over 
the next decade will u ndercut the focus on exclusivist ethnic and national 
questions. 
Encouraging popular participation in a broad range of civic groups and 
voluntary organisations will in turn greatly enhance public confidence in 
the reform process and in the legitimacy of the political system. A 
significant change in each nation’s political culture is necessary: one that 
counters decades of anti-democratic ideology and transforms both public 
institutions and public perceptions. 
Economic Progress:  A priority for each Balkan government is the 
consolidation of a credible market reform program. All too often in the 
past, vested interest groups have stalled or diverted the process to their 
advantage. Alternatively, numerous politicians have compromised on many 
essential market components by maintaining large-scale state subsidies to 
unprofitable enterprises and failing to ensure the transparent privatisation 
of the state sector. A comprehensive and effective reform program cannot 
be held hostage by any political party, economic lobby, trade union, or 
industrial sector. Janusz Bugajski 
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No program of economic transformation will gain easy popularity for any 
government and indeed most administrations are likely to be faced with the 
growing challenges of industrial unrest and public disquiet, as was the case 
in Romania in the winter of 1999. Nevertheless, a reformist government 
has to weather such storms and ensure that worker unrest is not exploited 
by radical anti-democratic elements or degenerates into a wholesale social 
and political breakdown. 
Significant successes also need to be registered in building public 
confidence in the transformation program and in fully respecting private 
property rights. This can be furthered through a credible media campaign 
on the benefits of capitalism and foreign investment and the astute 
promotion of successful new businesses  An appropriate business culture 
needs to be d eveloped in the region in which investment and hard work 
overcome the ethic of either “competitive egalitarianism” or reckless and 
semi-legal profit making among new entrepreneurs. 
Organised Crime Fighting:  Public security organs must remain strictly 
subject to governmental control and public accountability. At the same 
time, they must be authorised and empowered to deal with a growing and 
worrying problem throughout the region - organised crime and corruption. 
Launching widely publicised campaigns against these phenomena, often to 
score political points and gain public legitimacy, is definitely no substitute 
for a protracted and purposeful region-wide program. Both an internal and 
an international strategy must be pursued by each Balkan state working in 
tandem with its neighbours and with the Nato countries. 
The breadth and scope of organised crime and corruption in several 
countries presents a direct challenge to both domestic and regional stability. 
It also confronts the international community with some serious security 
problems in the years ahead. In order to effectively combat organised 
criminality, the Balkan governments must focus on both the domestic and 
regional environment. 
On the domestic front, the pervasiveness of politically connected economic 
corruption and criminality threatens to obstruct the reform process in the 
region’s fragile democracies. It contributes to consolidating the control of Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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special interest groups, undermines the institutionalisation of democratic 
procedures, encourages polarisation and radicalism, dissipates public 
confidence in the transformation process, and jeopardises economic 
stability, competition, and marketization. To combat domestic crime, 
appropriate laws must be passed and enforced and the police must be 
provided with relevant training, manpower, and equipment. No government 
official, manager, or businessman can stand above the law. 
Since the disintegration of communist rule and the collapse of the Yugoslav 
federation, the Balkan region has experienced a precipitous growth in both 
domestic corruption and international criminality. In several states, such as 
Bulgaria and Albania, political corruption assumed mammoth proportions 
in the mid-1990s and directly threatened economic progress and political 
stability. In both countries  it precipitated an economic collapse and in 
Albania it provoked a mass armed uprising against the central government. 
In other states, such as Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
criminal syndicates were not only linked with political leaderships but they 
directly benefited from the ethnic war and national partition. Indeed, 
criminal cliques formed a close link with nationalist radicals and the 
Socialist nomenklatura and seriously jeopardised regional stability. 
On the regional arena, organised crime  increasingly threatens international 
stability in a variety of ways; for example through illicit smuggling 
operations (drugs, arms, refugees, goods) and the forging of cross-national 
criminal syndicates that corrupt security and customs services and 
undermine the effectiveness of international policing. 
Such developments are a direct challenge to allied interests. For instance, 
they hinder the process of European institutional enlargement in the 
political, economic, and security spheres; they undermine the security and 
stability of transitional states; they promote the growth of international 
criminal syndicates; they provide opportunities for terrorist organisations 
linked with hostile anti-Western powers; and they engender illicit economic 
activities in the European democracies. To combat cross-border crime, the 
Balkan states must enhance judicial and police collaboration, work closely Janusz Bugajski 
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with multi-national crime fighting organisations, and even establish special 
multi-national investigative and law enforcement units. 
Untying Crime From Conflict:  Future scenarios of instability in various 
parts of South East Europe cannot be discounted, especially if the reform 
process in several countries is obstructed or diverted. Even more 
ominously, nationalist leaders with close criminal ties may promote fresh 
conflicts and instability in order to preserve their networks. Such scenarios 
could precipitate a major regional crisis and directly embroil Nato forces 
already present in the region. 
A breakdown of the tentative reform process in several Balkan states could 
precipitate a resurgence of populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism. 
This in turn could rapidly provoke ethnic, religious, and regional conflicts 
inside several countries and spur cross-border confrontations t hat will 
challenge Allied policy throughout the region. Nato’s goals of conflict 
containment and the projection of security could be imperilled by several 
simultaneous regional flashpoints. 
In the longer term, without a more resolute and coordinated approach to 
combating crime and defusing its political explosiveness, the stabilisation 
of the Balkan region (through domestic democratisation, the 
marginalization of extremism, economic reform, and security confidence 
building) could be seriously undermined. It may also require a substantial 
future outlay of Allied resources. Furthermore, fresh crises in the Balkans 
generated by domestic and international instabilities could seriously 
challenge Allied cohesion at a time when Nato requires a coordinated 
approach to its own enlargement and full agreement as to its post Cold War 
strategy and mission. 
Regional Cooperation 
Over the next ten years, a broad range of bilateral and multilateral relations 
could be further developed in the Balkans that will forestall the scenarios 
outlined above. Although these may not eliminate all sources of conflict 
and instability, they will ensure a steady and gradual improvement in the Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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region’s overall security situation. They will also help to ensure each 
country’s progress towards the major European structures and trans-
Atlantic institutions. 
As a basic maxim, it is often noted that democracies are less prone to wage 
war with each other and more liable to solve any outstanding problems 
through dialogue and compromise. It is in this context that “democratic 
security” becomes a valid concept and goal for the Balkan countries. There 
may be several initiatives through which inter-state relations could be 
enhanced during the next decade. Some of these have been launched in the 
region already in recent years, but will need to be substantially developed. 
They may include political treaties and other inter-governmental initiatives, 
numerous forms of economic and business cooperation, a process of 
regional security enhancement, and joint regional programs with Nato and 
various other pan-European bodies. 
Political Reinforcements: Each Balkan state needs to sign full treaties with 
all of its neighbours guaranteeing the recognition of existing international 
borders. Bulgaria’s inter-governmental agreement with Macedonia and 
Romania’s basic treaty with Hungary constitute positive steps in this 
direction. In addition to formal inter-state concordats, political relations can 
be strengthened through a range of institutions, whether parliamentary, 
political party, local government, or the NGO sector. These institutions can 
play a major supportive role in confidence building, in devising joint 
programs, in advising government officials, and in conducting assessments 
of critical problem areas. Furthermore, a n ongoing interface between 
government bodies and private institutions can help each state to develop 
stronger ties with each of its neighbours. 
Economic Structuring: Economic reform and market transformation should 
be seen not merely as domestic but as a region-wide concern. The failure of 
economic reform, a social breakdown, or the rise of authoritarianism in any 
specific country will directly challenge all neighbouring states. These 
negative trends could reverse their own reformist efforts by exacerbating 
regional instabilities and discouraging foreign investment. Janusz Bugajski 
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Hence, more emphasis must be placed over the coming years on building or 
reviving economic networks that serve to enhance the regional reform 
process through the Black Sea Economic Council, the  South Eastern 
European Cooperation Initiative (SECI), and other regional endeavours. In 
addition to increasing local trade, various joint programs could be pursued 
to promote regional entrepreneurship, banking, and investing. 
Governmental support for cross border investments and inter-regional tax 
free zones will stimulate enterprise, create jobs, and attract Western 
investors. 
Security Underpinnings: The Balkan countries individually and in terms of 
joint endeavours can take a much more active role in promoting regional 
stability and assisting their neighbours in furthering the security agenda. In 
a positive development, several Balkan neighbours signed an agreement in 
September 1998 to establish a Multinational Peace Force for Southeastern 
Europe (MPF). Each country has committed itself to contributing about 
5,000 troops to the MPF that was due to become operational within a few 
years. Such a force can be steadily developed to become interoperable with 
Nato in a range of Alliance missions. 
A more immediate  test case for the Balkan states is dealing with the 
unstable Yugoslav federation. It is evident that the remainder of 
Yugoslavia, and its contradictory centrifugal and centripetal forces, 
remains a central factor of instability in South Eastern Europe. In 
particular, the reanimation of Serbian nationalism may directly threaten the 
security and stability of its neighbours. 
The Independence Option:  One basic question needs to be urgently 
addressed by the region’s leaders concerning the future of the failing 
Yugoslav federation: can Yugoslavia survive without the threat of 
overwhelming force to keep both Montenegro and Kosovo within a 
Belgrade-dominated state? The new Kostunica administration has evidently 
failed to convince either the majority of Albanians and Montenegrins to 
remain within a federal framework. One viable solution is independence 
and statehood for Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia. Through such a step, 
the three states can focus more effectively on their own internal evolution Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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and eventual international integration without a plethora of destabilising 
internal, inter-ethnic, and regional distractions. 
With Montenegro moving towards independence through a planned 
republican referendum, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia may cease to 
exist by the end of 2001 and the unresolved status of Kosovo will become a 
major international priority. UN resolutions for the reintegration of Kosovo 
into a probably defunct “Yugoslavia”, raises serious questions about the 
self-rule of Kosovo’s population and its demands for statehood. Short of 
outright independence or a coerced merger with Serbia, Kosovo may 
experience a growing dependency relationship with international 
institutions that may become more difficult to overcome the longer this 
“stalemate” continues. 
Western leaders continue to believe that postponing the decision on 
Kosovo’s final legal status would allow for democratic changes to take 
place inside Serbia and enable a new relationship to emerge between Serbia 
and Kosovo. Critics of this approach predict that instead of a civilised 
marriage, Nato would simply be faced with escalating anger among the 
Albanian community if the UN insists on pushing Kosovo back under 
Belgrade’s control. 
A valid argument can be made that in order to avoid long-term dependence 
on outside agencies, or a destabilising spiral of conflict, self-determination 
and independence for Kosovo should be the principal objective of the 
international community. Such a step would have several positive 
symbolic, political, and security ramifications. It would restore Kosovo 
confidence in the international community and it will prevent a potential 
radicalisation of Albanian politics as long-term ambiguity on the status 
question, undermines the region’s democrats and encourages militant 
ambitions for c hanging borders and adding to Kosovo’s territory. 
Acceptance of future independence could also undercut the threat of a 
forced Serbian take-over by delegitimizing Belgrade’s incessant demands 
and threats towards Kosovo. Additionally, criteria and timetables for a 
democratic independent state will give both the internationals and the Janusz Bugajski 
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locals a concrete goal toward which political, institutional, and economic 
reconstruction can be directed. 
It is in the national interest of each Balkan country to devise strategies for a 
democratic Serbia and working with the new Serbian administrations. For 
example, practical steps could be taken to assist Serbia’s embryonic civic 
society, to aid the independent media, and to establish a variety of inter-
state contacts. At the  same time, the Balkan governments must work 
closely with Serbian democrats and with the allies in weakening and 
dislodging the ex-Socialists from positions of power and influence and 
severing their cross-border criminal networks. 
Kosovo’s statehood, if it  is handled astutely by the international 
community, could also help resolve the wider “Albanian question” in the 
South Balkans. Instead of provoking calls for a “Greater Albania”, such a 
step could pacify Albanian demands and allow Europe to increase its role 
and influence in the region. But in order for Kosovo to become a source of 
regional stability, Nato must also commit itself to stabilising Albania, 
Montenegro, and Macedonia. Nearby Balkan countries can find ways of 
assisting in this process. 
Resolving the Albanian Question:  A timetable must be established for 
establishing a Nato protectorate in Kosovo and providing a protective 
umbrella for the construction of Kosovo’s political, legal, and security 
institutions. The interim international protectorate  can then evolve from 
autonomy to sovereignty. The OSCE must oversee the creation of a new 
Kosovo administration in a much more resolute manner than in Bosnia. 
During the next few years, Kosovo can establish all the elements and 
qualifications for statehood. 
The emerging government authority in Prishtina will have to renounce any 
territorial claims to Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro, sign treaties with 
its three Slavic neighbours, and commit itself to democratic pluralism, the 
rule of law, a market economy, and European integration. The long-term 
presence of OSCE monitors under a Nato umbrella would help ensure 
Pristina’s compliance with a range of democratic norms. The OSCE must 
prepare an election timetable, lawyers must draw up a constitution, human Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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rights activists must forge comprehensive legislation to protect the Serb, 
Roma, Muslim, and other minorities in preparation for independence. 
The international community and the entire Balkan region need to make a 
firmer commitment to Macedonia, Montenegro, a nd Albania in ensuring 
their territorial integrity and domestic development. In Macedonia the 
multi-ethnic polity must be promoted with expanded rights for the 
Albanian population that would dissipate demands for separation. Albania 
itself must be rebuilt  as a secure and law-abiding state while eliminating 
gunrunners, smugglers, and other criminal organisations and corrupt 
officials. 
Montenegro should be allowed to rejoin all international institutions. The 
republic needs to obtain more prominent recognition and protection as a 
sovereign entity as it stands on the verge of regaining its independence and 
statehood. In a regional context, Kosovo, Serbia, Albania, Macedonia, and 
Montenegro could be encouraged to formalise a multilateral regional treaty 
that guarantees the new borders, and promotes free movement, trade, and 
all forms of inter-state cooperation. Bulgaria and Romania could sign this 
“Balkan Pact” as larger guarantors of stability and inter-state cooperation. 
International Involvement 
There is a general consensus among Western policy makers that any 
“second wave” of Nato enlargement is not imminent and could well be 
further delayed for most if not all of the Balkan candidates. Furthermore, 
the prospect of European Union accession appears to be at least five years 
away even for the worthiest contenders in South East Europe. The Union 
will probably take at least two more years to absorb six new states and may 
not decide on further enlargement until this process is virtually completed. 
Given the realities of Nato and EU decision-making, regardless of its 
wisdom, the Balkan states must focus on devising a strategy that steadily 
improves their progress towards both institutions. 
Progress towards Nato and EU:  A three-pronged approach could prove 
efficacious  for each country during the next few years. First, each Janusz Bugajski 
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government should demonstrate its commitment to meeting the guidelines 
for a ccession to both organisations. Progress registered in the domestic 
reform process (economic, political, institutional) would have positive 
ramifications in terms of each country’s qualifications as stable and 
credible future members. The Alliance will be closely monitoring the 
progress of each country in terms of their domestic political stability and 
commitment to economic restructuring. Their security of course involves 
much more than military capability. It needs to contain specific political 
and economic elements that provide military security with a firm 
foundation by consolidating democratic institutions in transitional 
countries. 
In this scenario, either Russia becomes more accommodating towards 
further Nato expansion or its opposition to this process will have little 
relevance for Alliance decision-making. Moscow’s acquiescence could be 
the result of two internal factors. First, Russia itself could undergo a 
process of territorial disintegration, with the emergence of several new 
independent states in the Caucasus, Siberia, and the Far East. This would 
greatly diminish Moscow’s capacity for interference in the politics and 
security of South East Europe. A second but less plausible development is 
the emergence of a democratic and law-abiding Russia that revokes its 
imperial and great power aspirations and forges genuinely collaborative 
arrangements with the Nato alliance. E ither of these two scenarios will 
reduce concerns in the allied capitals that Nato enlargement in the Balkans 
will damage relations with Moscow. 
Regional Activism: In a second parallel strategy, the Balkan states that are 
serious about Nato inclusion must pursue an activist role in their region to 
generate security and cooperation beyond their borders. Indeed, instead of 
hammering away at Nato membership as the panacea for all their problems, 
each government can prove their worth by contributing in practical ways to 
Alliance goals and missions both in South Eastern Europe and elsewhere. 
Such a role can take various forms, including participation in peace-
keeping and humanitarian endeavours, enabling Nato to use their territories 
for allied missions, offering bases and other facilities to Nato forces, and Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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deepening involvement in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs. The 
Balkan states must also pursue close bilateral ties with the three new 
Alliance members and seek to benefit from their experiences in the process 
of Nato integration. 
Joint Initiatives:  Third, each Balkan state should actively support joint 
regional initiatives that enhance security and cooperation outside the 
Alliance framework. Instead of waiting for Nato leadership, support, or 
protection, ambitious states will aim to construct a framework for security 
in various arenas (as outlined in the previous section). Instead of competing 
for Nato and EU accession, placing their own interests above regional 
concerns, or engaging in “strategic blackmail” (by for example claiming 
that exclusion from Nato will result in domestic breakdowns, social unrest, 
and dangerous instability), responsible governments will act as domestic 
developers and regional stabilisers. 
Over the next five years substantial success can be achieved in these three 
areas. As Nato digests its three new Central European members, develops 
and applies its new Strategic Concept, restructures its cost sharing 
arrangements, and reinvigorates its vision of an all-European security 
Organization, the most progressive Balkan states can obtain membership. 
In fact, they could be seen as a natural addition to the Alliance and as 
significant contributors to trans-Atlantic goals. 
4. Balkan Futures III: Progressive Integration 
The optimal positive scenario of development for the Balkans over the next 
decade envisages rapid success both in the process of domestic 
transformation and the consolidation of regional security. On the domestic 
front, this would mean the assurance of long-term political stability, the 
consolidation of legitimate and efficient institutions, a vibrant civic society, 
and a fully functioning market economy increasingly tied to the global 
market in general and to the European Union in particular. 
On the regional arena, “progressive integration” would entail a well-
developed network of bilateral relations, the existence of effective Janusz Bugajski 
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multilateral groupings, and a secure and stable Balkan region that can 
integrate with all the major pan-European and trans-Atlantic institutions. 
By the year 2010, all of the Balkan states can thereby attain membership of 
Nato and the EU and be in a position to project security further afield 
towards the Black Sea and Middle Eastern regions. They can be active 
participants in a range of allied missions both inside and outside Europe. 
Domestic Transformation 
Political Democracies:  The first prerequisite for secure development and 
international integration is the permanent stability of democratic and 
pluralistic political systems. Undoubtedly, not all states are likely to 
achieve a smooth evolution without some unforeseen setbacks and 
reversals. Nevertheless, several concrete political goals need to be met by 
the year 2010. 
First, the political structure must ensure an effective and efficient 
separation of powers, balancing the various branches of government 
through a system of checks and balances. Second, a range of successful 
political parties must be represented in state institutions and enabled to 
compete fairly and freely through regular national and local elections. 
Strong governing parties and coalitions should be counterbalanced by an 
effective and vibrant opposition. 
Third, extremist political formations advocating dictatorship, 
authoritarianism, ethno-nationalism, xenophobia, and racism must be 
exposed and marginalized and not allowed to threaten the stability of the 
national polity through non-democratic means. Although no views should 
be prohibited in a developing democracy, hate propaganda and racist 
attacks must be a nswered and countered by responsible politicians and 
media outlets. Fourth, national and ethnic minorities must be involved in 
political decision-making through their inclusion in parliaments as well as 
in local and r egional governments. Fifth, through a process of 
administrative decentralisation, local and municipal authorities must be 
empowered to function and to effectively canvass for the interests of their 
constituents. Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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Democratic Institutionalisation:  Within the coming decade, the Balkan 
states need to develop stable and authoritative democratic institutions based 
on constitutional principles. Government organs must benefit from full 
public confidence and the commitment of all the major political players. 
The civil administration has to be efficient, competent, and professional, 
and on a par with the Central and Western European states. 
The police and intelligence forces must be under strict governmental 
control and supervision. They must have the authority and capability to 
engender public trust and confidence in the system of justice and law 
enforcement. A fully independent judiciary will give substance to 
individual rights and liberties without governmental or political 
interference. Public trust in the institutions of law and order must be 
widespread and visible. Civil-military relations must be fully restructured 
to meet the appropriate Nato criteria and enable full governmental controls 
over the country’s armed forces. 
Thriving Civic Societies:  By the year 2010, each Balkan country can 
develop an effective and robust alternative m edia as well as professional 
state funded media outlets. Equally important will be a broad range of 
influential and participatory interest groups representing entrepreneurs, 
consumers, women, ethnic, religious, and other minorities, 
environmentalists, taxpayers, and other sectors of society or issue-focused 
groupings. Public participation in the political and decision-making process 
will be evident in the media, through the internet, in local and regional 
government, and in the activities of a range of civic organisations. Such a 
process will greatly e nrich the Balkan democracies by enabling public 
input into decision-making and cultivating a new generation of politicians 
and businessmen. 
Economic Capitalism: During the next decade, the most advanced Balkan 
states can successfully construct a functioning market economy. The state 
sector will need to be limited to a few strategic industries and to ensuring 
fair economic competition. Business activities must be regulated by 
effective laws to minimise the opportunities for corruption, nepotism, and 
monopolisation. Each successive government in the next ten years simply Janusz Bugajski 
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cannot compromise on the most essential components of a viable capitalist 
economy, including limitations on state subsidies to national enterprises, a 
balanced national budget, a transparent and open privatisation process, and 
fair business competition. 
In sum, the demanding and extensive economic reform program cannot be 
held hostage by any political party, economic lobby, trade union, industrial 
sector, or other interest group. Moreover, if the transformations are 
successful by the year 2010 the majority of the Balkan populations will 
have accepted democratic capitalism as the most productive and efficient 
economic system. It will be widely seen as ensuring growth and prosperity, 
and guaranteeing international institutional integration. 
Regional Synchronization 
Three overlapping foreign policy avenues must be pursued by each Balkan 
state in which self-interest will dictate closer regional Synchronization in a 
range of policy questions. These must involve strong bilateral cooperation, 
the promotion of multilateral groupings, and concerted “security 
production”. 
Bilateral Cooperation: Over the next decade, a broad range of cooperative 
bilateral relations could become the norm and not the exception in South 
Eastern Europe. Although not all sources of conflict and instability will be 
precluded, any lingering disputes are more likely to focus on solvable 
economic questions instead of intractable territorial and minority issues. 
Indeed, the most combustible minority and border questions will have been 
resolved at both bilateral and multilateral levels. This will ensure a secure 
and stable Balkan region prepared for the rigors of European integration. 
First,  bilateral relations would need to focus on resolving all outstanding 
conflicts and disputes and thereby removing potentially destabilising issues 
from the agenda that could be exploited by nationalists, protectionists, and 
hostile or ambitious outside powers. Questions of borders and minority 
rights must be paramount in the settlement process involving political 
leaders from all relevant ethnic communities. Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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Second, bilateral programs between neighbours and non-neighbours could 
be pursued in a variety of areas, including cultural exchanges, educational 
and informational programs, student exchanges, cooperation in writing 
joint histories, inter-regional ventures in the economic, infrastructural, and 
environmental fields, business investment, NGO networking, media 
linkages, inter-city twining, inter-parliamentary commissions, and inter-
governmental councils. These and other initiatives will reinforce inter-state 
and inter-societal cooperation across the region. 
Multilateral Groupings: By the year 2010, the economic transformation 
will impact on the entire region. With each state having invested in 
building or reviving regional economic networks the whole area will be 
better prepared for meeting the challenges of EU and Nato entry. Regional 
initiatives such as the Black Sea Economic Council, the South Eastern 
European Cooperation Initiative, and the South East European Free Trade 
Area will become realities that will boost trade, investment, and 
productivity. Multilateral support for a cross-regional tax free zone w ill 
also help stimulate enterprise, employment, and foreign investment. All of 
these factors will help to propel each state towards EU membership. 
Indeed, some countries such as Bulgaria and Romania could already attain 
Union entry by the middle of the decade. 
Security Production:  The Balkan countries individually and in terms of 
joint endeavours can take a much more active role in promoting regional 
stability and assisting their neighbours in furthering the trans-Atlantic 
security agenda. For example, by t he year 2010, the Multinational Peace 
Force in Southeastern Europe (MPF) could become fully operational under 
Nato’s auspices as a regional and even an extra-regional force in missions 
such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and peace keeping even 
outside the Balkans. 
The security arena will provide a valuable avenue of cooperation with the 
allies, in terms of knowledge, expertise, training, and exchange programs. 
Each state, in line with its capabilities, must work with Nato as a whole and 
with i ndividual Nato states on relevant local programs. Within the next 
decade, at least two Balkan states (Romania and Bulgaria) could attain Janusz Bugajski 
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Nato membership and their armed forces will gradually become 
interoperable with the Alliance. This will further contribute to stabilising 
the region by providing an enticement for neighbouring states and a secure 
setting for subsequent Nato enlargement. 
International Integration 
Nato membership itself will have a generally positive impact on the newly 
included states. First, it will help to anchor them in the Euro-Atlantic 
security system and provide them with an invaluable protective umbrella 
against any threats to their independence or territorial integrity. Second, it 
will accelerate the process of internal reform, particularly but not 
exclusively in the military realm. Membership will provide important 
additional sources of legitimacy to the political and economic 
transformation and it can thereby help ensure domestic stability. And 
thirdly, it can encourage international trade and Western business 
investment in a much more stable and secure political and economic 
environment. 
European Integration: One essential objective for all Balkan states should 
be full European Union membership. Although none of the Balkan 
countries is currently being considered for accession, the process of 
enlargement is unlikely to stall indefinitely despite periodic resistance by 
individual West European governments. At their 1993 meeting in 
Copenhagen, EU heads of state and government leaders confirmed their 
commitment to i ncorporate all of the East European states holding 
partnership and association agreements with the EU when they fulfil the 
relevant political and economic requirements. 
By 2010, at least two Balkan states (Romania and Bulgaria) can 
comfortably attain full membership and several others such as Croatia can 
be on track for accession. By focusing on economic restructuring, 
registering steady economic growth, conducting necessary institutional and 
legal r eforms, and not being discouraged by shifting timetables, the 
Balkans will be gradually absorbed by the major pan-European institution. 
The benefits of membership, in terms of investment, trade, and financial Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
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assistance should become self-evident from the experience of nearby 
Central European states that will attain accession earlier in the decade. 
Alliance Strategies:  Nato planners have concentrated primarily on the 
impact of enlargement on Central Europe. They have not comprehensively 
addressed the question of rejected candidates and their reactions to 
exclusion from the Alliance. The onus is on the allied governments to 
devise a longer-term security strategy that will not only ensure security and 
the collective defence of the stable Central European nations but will 
project security  further afield, particularly towards the currently unstable 
parts of the continent. 
One important component of such a strategy would be to offer firmer 
defence arrangements to countries that have been omitted from the first 
wave of entrants. Much depends of course on whether Nato will continue to 
expand or whether its enlargement will stop in Central Europe. Several 
Balkan governments continue to assert that potential Nato membership 
should be judged on the merits of a case-by-case scenario and not on 
automatic first tier or second tier entry. Nonetheless, they are likely to be 
initially e xcluded as the Western governments still fear that rapid 
expansion could dilute Nato’s capabilities, strain budgetary resources, and 
aggravate relations with Russia. 
Of the many impending Nato decisions, the enlargement question will gain 
prominence over the coming year before the planned fall 2002 summit. If 
indeed, Alliance leaders decide to push for expansion they will be faced 
with two options, a “tactical enlargement” or a “strategic enlargement.” A 
“tactical enlargement” would be the safe way to proceed by bringing in two 
countries that have almost fully met Alliance criteria and seem well on the 
way towards European “normalcy” – Slovenia and Slovakia. The two states 
are stable, have democratic coalition governments, are unlikely to revert to 
authoritarianism and nationalism, and have no major internal ethnic 
conflicts or external disputes with neighbours. 
A tactical expansion would therefore be based primarily on meeting criteria 
laid out by Nato planners and it would be a technical decision rather than a 
political move. It would also enable Alliance leaders to claim that the Janusz Bugajski 
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evolutionary process continues and that Nato is not stationary in its 
contribution to European security. However, a “tactical enlargement” may 
also send the wrong signals not only to other aspiring states but also to 
Nato’s opponents in Moscow. Excluded countries, with no immediate 
prospects of membership, may conclude that no further decisions will  be 
taken for at least two years after the 2002 Prague Summit. Some may 
complain that their efforts to meet the required criteria have been in vain. 
They may also see non-admittance as a means of assigning them 
permanently to a “grey zone” susceptible to incessant Russian intrigues. 
In stark contrast, a “strategic enlargement” would be a bold and decisive 
move to expand the boundaries of European security, even if not all criteria 
have been met by individual countries. In fact, supporters of a broader 
expansion argue that it is precisely the inclusion of developing states that 
would consolidate their democracies and prevent any reversals. A 
“strategic enlargement” could take several forms. Less likely is a “big 
bang” approach, as proposed by state presidents of the Vilnius Nine (V-9) 
initiative who would like to see all contenders brought into NATO 
simultaneously. This is extremely unlikely, given the degree of planning, 
coordination, and political consensus that would be needed. More probable 
is a measured strategic approach that pinpoints those states that are most 
important for Nato’s development and for the expansion of European 
security. 
A calculated strategic initiative would focus on three regions: Central 
Europe, the Baltics, and the Balkans. The inclusion of both Slovakia and 
Slovenia would complete the Central European space as an integral part of 
the Alliance. The inclusion of Lithuania would indicate that the “open 
door” policy is not a myth and that Russia has no veto power over Nato 
decisions. It would also recognize the progress that the three Baltic states 
have made in building stable democracies. 
And the inclusion of Bulgaria or Romania would counter the conventional 
supposition that the Balkans will simply remain part of the European 
periphery,  forever torn by conflict and violence. The message would be 
clear to all other contenders: better that the Balkans enter Nato than Nato Facing The Future: The Balkans To The Year 2010 
 65
remain indefinitely in the Balkans. If Greece and Turkey were able to gain 
entry at their stage of development, then why not allow in their most eager 
Northern neighbours. 
A “strategic enlargement” would inspire all aspirant states and above all, it 
would constitute a major political decision rather than a technical 
agreement based on criteria alone. But for this to happen, a credible case 
needs to be constructed for legislators, policy makers, and for public 
opinion in the West. This needs to be based on two resonating principles: 
interest and values. It is in American interests to bring Europe under a 
single security umbrella as this can help to deter and minimise conflicts, 
expand the European share of the defence burden, provide more manpower 
to peace-making and peace-keeping deployments, further the process of 
democratisation, and provide a more stable underpinning to capitalism, 
investment, and free trade. In terms of values, Nato enlargement will also 
recognize and help expand the principles of open societies, democratic rule, 
social pluralism, and international cooperation. 
Additionally, a fuller Nato would create less institutional confusion for 
planners and commanders as the process of European Union enlargement 
will not correspond with Nato growth. Several countries will be caught 
struggling between the two organisms rather than focusing on meeting the 
onerous criteria for EU entry while having their security assured. It is here 
that the major European states should play a more responsible role in the 
continent’s security by pushing strenuously for a “strategic enlargement”. 
Until the Europeans finally come to grips w ith their inability to take bold 
and important decisions, proposals for a European Defence Identity are 
likely to remain an ephemeral theory. 
6. Conclusions: Balkan Realism 
This paper is intended to project and assess a comprehensive scenario of 
developments in the Balkans over the next decade. It argues that the region 
can expect three possible scenarios characterised by very specific internal 
and external evolutions. The first scenario envisages a major breakdown in Janusz Bugajski 
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the region’s development, marked by accelerating domestic devolutions, 
spiralling regional rivalries, and growing international isolation. 
The second scenario depicts a minimal but constructive evolution in the 
Balkans characterised by domestic stabilisation, regional cooperation, and 
increasing international involvement. The third scenario posits an optimal 
constructive development, involving major domestic transformations, 
regional synchronisation, and the full international institutional integration 
of virtually all of the Balkan states. 
In order to achieve at least a minimal constructive evolution, each Balkan 
country should aim for an optimal transformation by the year 2010. While 
some threats to stability and progress can be overcome in a reasonably 
short period of time, other challenges will preoccupy the region for at least 
a decade. It is vital that despite all the obstacles outlined in this paper, 
government leaders provide a vision to their societies on what each country 
can and should achieve during the next decade. Simultaneously, this vision 
must become reality through the application of practical policy steps and 
targeted international support and assistance. ZEI DISCUSSION PAPER:   Bisher erschienen / Already published: 
C  1 (1998)  Frank Ronge (Hrsg.) 
Die baltischen Staaten auf dem Weg in die Europäische Union 
C  2 (1998)  Gabor Erdödy 
Die Problematik der europäischen Orientierung Ungarns 
C  3 (1998)  Stephan Kux 
Zwischen Isolation und autonomer Anpassung: Die Schweiz im 
integrationspolitischen Abseits? 
C  4 (1998)  Guido Lenzi 
The WEU between NATO and EU 
C  5 (1998)  Andreas Beierwaltes 
Sprachenvielfalt in der EU – Grenze einer Demokratisierung Europas?  
C  6 (1998)  Jerzy Buzek 
Poland’s Future in a United Europe 
C  7 (1998)  Doug Henderson 
The British Presidency of the EU and British European Policy 
C  8 (1998)  Simon Upton 
Europe and Globalisation on the Threshold of the 21st Century.  
A New Zealand Perspective 
C  9 (1998)  Thanos Veremis 
Greece, the Balkans and the European Union 
C 10 (1998)  Zoran Djindjic 
Serbiens Zukunft in Europa 
C 11 (1998)  Marcus Höreth 
The Trilemma of Legitimacy. Multilevel Governance in the EU and  
the Problem of Democracy 
C 12 (1998)  Saadollah Ghaussy 
Japan and the European Union 
C 13 (1998)  Walter Schweidler 
Bioethische Konflikte und ihre politische Regelung in Europa 
C 14 (1998)  Wolfgang Ischinger 
Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach Amsterdam 
C 15 (1998)  Kant K. Bhargava 
EU – SAARC: Comparisons and Prospects of Cooperation 
C 16 (1998)  Anthony J. Nicholls 
Die deutsch-britischen Beziehungen: Ein hoffnungsloser Fall? 
C 17 (1998)  Nikolaj Petersen 
The Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam 
C 18 (1998)  Aschot L. Manutscharjan 
Der Konflikt um Berg-Karabach: Grundproblematik und Lösungsperspektiven 
C 19 (1998)  Stefan Fröhlich 
Der Ausbau der europäischen Verteidigungsidentität zwischen WEU und NATO 
C 20 (1998)  Tönis Lukas 
Estland auf dem Weg aus der totalitären Vergangenheit zurück nach Europa 
C 21 (1998)  Wim F. van Eekelen 
Perspektiven der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU 
C 22 (1998)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Europa in den Kräftefeldern des 21. Jahrhunderts.  
C 23 (1998)  Marco Bifulco 
In Search of an Identity for Europe 
C 24 (1998)  Zbigniew Czachór 
Ist Polen reif für die Europäische Union? 
C 25 (1998)  Avi Primor 
Der Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten und die Rolle der Europäischen Union 
C 26 (1998)  Igor Leshoukov 
Beyond Satisfaction: Russia’s Perspectives on European Integration 
C 27 (1998)  Dirk Rochtus 
Die belgische „Nationalitätenfrage“ als Herausforderung für Europa  
C 28 (1998)  Jürgen Rüttgers 
Europa – Erbe und Auftrag 
C 29 (1999)  Murat T. Laumulin 
Die EU als Modell für die zentralasiatische Integration? 
C 30 (1999)  Valdas Adamkus 
Europe as Unfinished Business: The Role of Lithuania  
in the 21
st Century‘s Continent 
C 31 (1999)  Ivo Samson 
Der widerspruchsvolle Weg der Slowakei in die EU.  
C 32 (1999)  Rudolf Hrbek / Jean-Paul Picaper / Arto Mansala 
Deutschland und Europa. Positionen, Perzeptionen, Perspektiven 
C 33 (1999)  Dietrich von Kyaw 
Prioritäten der deutschen EU-Präsidentschaft unter Berücksichtigung des  
Europäischen Rates in Wien 
C 34 (1999)  Hagen Schulze 
Die Identität Europas und die Wiederkehr der Antike 
C 35 (1999)  Günter Verheugen 
Germany and the EU Council Presidency 
C 36 (1999)  Friedbert Pflüger 
Europas globale Verantwortung – Die Selbstbehauptung der alten Welt 
C 37 (1999)  José María Gil-Robles 
Der Vertrag von Amsterdam: Herausforderung für die Europäische Union 
C 38 (1999)  Peter Wittschorek 
Präsidentenwahlen in Kasachstan 1999 
C 39 (1999)  Anatolij Ponomarenko 
Die europäische Orientierung der Ukraine 
C 40 (1999)  Eduard Kukan 
The Slovak Republic on its Way into the European Union 
C 41 (1999)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Europa auf der Suche nach einer neuen geistigen Gestalt 
C 42 (1999)  Simon Green 
Ausländer, Einbürgerung und Integration: Zukunftsperspektive der  
europäischen Unionsbürgerschaft? 
C 43 (1999)  Ljerka Mintas Hodak 
Activities of the Government of the Republic of Croatia in the Process of  
European Integration 
C 44 (1999)  Wolfgang Schäuble 
Unsere Verantwortung für Europa 
C 45 (1999)  Eric Richard Staal 
European Monetary Union: The German Political-Economic Trilemma 
C 46 (1999)  Marek J. Siemek 
Demokratie und Philosophie 
C 47 (1999)  Ioannis Kasoulides 
Cyprus and its Accession to the European Union 
C 48 (1999)  Wolfgang Clement 
Perspektiven nordrhein-westfälischer Europapolitik 
C 49 (1999)  Volker Steinkamp 
Die Europa-Debatte deutscher und französischer Intellektueller nach dem  
Ersten Weltkrieg 
C 50 (1999)  Daniel Tarschys 
50 Jahre Europarat 
C 51 (1999)  Marcin Zaborowski 
Poland, Germany and EU Enlargement 
C 52 (1999)  Romain Kirt 
Kleinstaat und Nationalstaat im Zeitalter der Globalisierung 
C 53 (1999)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Die Zukunft des europäischen Einigungsgedankens  
C 54 (1999)  Lothar Rühl 
Conditions and options for an autonomous „Common European Policy on Security 
and Defence“ in and by the European Union in the post-Amsterdam perspective 
opened at Cologne in June 1999 
C 55 (1999)  Marcus Wenig (Hrsg.) 
Möglichkeiten einer engeren Zusammenarbeit in Europa am Beispiel  
Deutschland - Slowakei 
C 56 (1999)  Rafael Biermann 
The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe - potential, problems and  
perspectives 
C 57 (1999)  Eva Slivková 
Slovakia’s Response on the Regular Report from the European Commission  
on Progress towards Accession 
C 58 (1999)  Marcus Wenig (Ed.) 
A Pledge for an Early Opening of EU-Accession Negotiations 
C 59 (1999)  Ivo Sanader 
Croatia´s Course of Action to Achieve EU Membership 
C 60 (2000)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Europas Identität und die Kraft des Christentums 
C 61 (2000)  Kai Hafez 
The West and Islam in the Mass Media 
C 62 (2000)  Sylvie Goulard 
Französische Europapolitik und öffentliche Debatte in Frankreich 
C 63 (2000)  Elizabeth Meehan 
Citizenship and the European Union 
C 64 (2000)  Günter Joetze 
The European Security Landscape after Kosovo 
C 65 (2000)  Lutz Rathenow 
Vom DDR-Bürger zum EU-Bürger 
C 66 (2000)  Panos Kazakos 
Stabilisierung ohne Reform 
C 67 (2000)  Marten van Heuven 
Where will NATO be ten years from now ? 
C 68 (2000)  Carlo Masala 
Die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft 
C 69 (2000)  Weltachsen 2000/World Axes 2000. A documentation 
C 70 (2000)  Gert Maichel 
Mittel-/Osteuropa: Warum engagieren sich deutsche Unternehmen? 
C 71 (2000)  Marcus Wenig (Hrsg.) 
Die Bürgergesellschaft als ein Motor der europäischen Integration 
C 72 (2000)  Ludger Kühnhardt/Henri Ménudier/Janusz Reiter 
Das Weimarer Dreieck 
C 73 (2000)  Ramiro Xavier Vera-Fluixa 
Regionalbildungsansätze in Lateinamerika und ihr Vergleich mit der Europäischen 
Union 
C 74 (2000)  Xuewu Gu (Hrsg.) 
Europa und Asien: Chancen für einen interkulturellen Dialog? 
C 75 (2000)  Stephen C. Calleya 
Is the Barcelona Process working? 
C 76 (2000)  Àkos Kengyel 
The EU´s Regional Policy and its extension to the new members  
C 77 (2000)  Gudmundur H. Frìmannsson 
Civic Education in Europe: Some General Principles 
C 78 (2000)  Marcus Höreth 
Stille Revolution im Namen des Rechts? 
C 79 (2000)  Franz-Joseph Meiers 
Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsidentität (ESVI) oder Gemeinsame 
Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (GESVP)? C 80 (2000)  Gennady Fedorov 
Kaliningrad Alternatives Today 
C 81 (2001)  Ann Mettler 
From Junior Partner to Global Player: The New Transatlantic Agenda and Joint 
Action Plan 
C 82 (2001)  Emil Minchev 
Southeastern Europe at the beginning of the 21
st century 
C 83 (2001)  Lothar Rühl 
Structures, possibilities and limits of European crisis reaction forces for conflict 
prevention and resolution 
C 84 (2001)  Viviane Reding 
Die Rolle der EG bei der Entwicklung Europas von der Industriegesellschaft zur 
Wissens- und Informationsgesellschaft 
C 85 (2001)  Ludger Kühnhardt 
Towards Europe 2007. Identity, Institution–Building and the Constitution of Europe 
C 86 (2001)  Janusz Bugajski 
Facing the Future: The Balkans to the Year 2010 
C 87 (2001)  Frank Ronge / Susannah Simon (eds.) 
Multiculturalism and Ethnic Minorities in Europe 
C 88 (2001)  Ralf Elm 
Notwendigkeit, Aufgaben und Ansätze einer interkulturellen Philosophie 
C 89 (2001)  Tapio Raunio / Matti Wiberg 
The Big Leap to the West: The Impact of EU on the Finnish Political System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Das Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI) wurde 1995 als selbständig 
arbeitende, interdisziplinäre Forschungseinrichtung an der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-
Universität Bonn gegründet. In Forschung, Lehre und Politikberatung sowie im Dialog zwischen 
Wissenschaft und Praxis beteiligt sich das ZEI an der Lösung bisher unbewältigter Probleme der 
europäischen Einigung und der Gestaltung der Rolle Europas in der Welt. Weitere Informationen 
finden Sie auf unserer Homepage im Internet: http://www.zei.de. 
ZEI – DISCUSSION PAPERS richten sich mit ihren von Wissenschaftlern und politischen Akteuren 
verfaßten Beiträgen an Wissenschaft, Politik und Publizistik. Jeder Beitrag unterliegt einem 
internen Auswahlverfahren und einer externen Begutachtung. Gleichwohl gibt er die persönliche 
Meinung der Autoren wieder. Die Beiträge fassen häufig Ergebnisse aus laufenden 
Forschungsprojekten zusammen. Die aktuelle Liste finden Sie auf unserer Homepage: 
http://www.ZEI.de. 
The Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) was established in 1995 as an 
independent, interdisciplinary research institute at the University of Bonn. With research, teaching 
and political consultancy ZEI takes part in an intensive dialogue between scholarship and society 
in contributing to the resolution of problems of European integration and the development of 
Europe´s global role. For further information, see: http://www.zei.de. 
ZEI – DISCUSSION PAPERS are intended to stimulate discussion among researchers, practitioners 
and policy makers on current and emerging issues of European integration and Europe´s global 
role. Each paper has been exposed to an internal discussion within the Center for European 
Integration Studies (ZEI) and an external peer review. The papers mostly reflect work in progress. 
For a current list, see the center‘s homepage: http://www.ZEI.de.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1435-3288          ISBN 3-933307-86-4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Walter-Flex-Straße 3  Tel.:  +49-228-73-1880 
D-53113 Bonn  Fax: +49-228-73-1788 
Germany  http://www.zei.de 
 
 
 
 
 
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn